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Preliminary Survey
of
INSURGENCY
in URBAN AREAS
APPENDIX A

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APPENDIX A

PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF URBAN INSURGENCY

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APPENDIX A

HISTORICAL EVIDENCE

AREAS OF EMPHASIS IN THE HISTORICAL SYNTHESIS

The matters treated in the general survey portions of this paper are structured in accordance with the four-fold division explained in Part I. The specific analyses, within these several divisions, examine the characteristic indicators, incident patterns and countermeasures taken and the special significance of particular societal groups within the insurgent picture. The demonstration in urban areas, not immediately associated with an attempted power seizure, is assigned the greatest attention for three reasons:

1. The demonstration is one of the most valuable and most utilized weapons in the total phenomenon of insurgency. It appears in all insurgent phases.
2. All of the essential principles and techniques appearing in the other forms of urban insurgency, exist already during "Phase One Insurgency" and a detailed treatment of these procedures in conjunction with the urban demonstration lessens the need for their isolated treatment as they apply to the second, third and fourth models of urban operations.
3. This is the form of urban activities which can be expected to occur in Thailand most frequently in the immediate future.

At the heart of these urban operations is the strategic and tactical utilization of the mass organizations (in English language usage, the "front"). From it, the insurgent attempts to build a system of power paralleling the established power hierarchy, resulting in a system of dual power. Consequently an additional word should be added here to explain what is meant by a dual power structure.

Philip Selznick, in his The Organizational Weapon, asserts that "the mass in a revolutionary crisis is a great hammer to destroy the stable, regular leadership of all institutions." ¹ Given the Communist's will to power and full agreement with Selznick's pronouncement, it is understandable that they--as well as other schooled insurgents--have developed a "basic sensitivity to the importance of mass involvement." ²

The aim of the Marxists has been to split the community, to undermine the principles of legitimacy upon which existing authority rests, to create new institutions to rally the total allegiance of the workers. In action, such a policy inevitably creates organs of dual power. If a union leadership believes that the "bosses' government" is not to be trusted, then in a strike the union will be prepared to assume the functions of government on a local scale. If the official police are believed to be biased, the union may prepare its own means of maintaining order. If it is felt that the hospitals are being used to isolate union militants, special first-aid stations may be established. Such manifestations of dual power are usually episodic. Nevertheless, even these indicate its basic nature: the assumption of governmental functions and prerogatives by private

associations when the authority of the sovereign is in decline.

Although a breakdown of the monopoly of organized violence and of control over key economic and social institutions may lead to embryonic dual-power situations, the important point is not the collapse of practical control as such. That may occur in disasters, or as a result of external attack, without serious consequences for the locus of sovereignty. Ultimately, the issue turns on sentiment. The emergence of significant dual power depends on the alienation of sectors of the community, not simply on new upcroppings of powerful forces.³

References to this procedure will be frequent in the following statement. The presence or absence of the principles involved here serve not only as a determinate of success or failure in specific urban operations, but, importantly, fundamentally alter the incident patterns, their indicators and the alternatives open to counterinsurgent forces.

In treating such matters as the above, this study will employ the following four models for the purposes of classification and for analysis of patterns and factors in the various insurgency situations under consideration:

Model One - The Urban Demonstration.

Model Two - The Bid for Power Through Seizure of a City.

Model Three - Precipitation of Nationwide Insurgency.

Model Four - Support of Rural Operations.

MODEL ONE: THE URBAN DEMONSTRATION

Form One: The Premeditated Mass Disturbance

TOKYO - MAY AND JUNE 1960

Abstract. These demonstrations are an example of the type conducted for ends short of the complete seizure of political power in an urban center, in which a system of mass organizations is progressively mobilized to inhibit the orderly processes of government and provoke an incident of international proportions (Model One, Form 1). In the process, a wide variety of techniques was utilized, stretching from the movement of outside personnel into the active arena to the deployment of strong-arm squads and agit/prop specialists. The counterinsurgent response consisted of little more than the stationing of police forces at critical centers where they could be thrown in against agitating mobs when they became unduly destructive. The initiative throughout lay with the demonstrators.

An extended period of turmoil in Tokyo was triggered on 20 May 1960 by passage through the lower house of the Japanese Diet of the revised US-Japanese Security Treaty. There followed a series of three waves of mass demonstrations, the first of which reached its crest nearly a week later on 26 May with some 20 hours of intense activity. The second occurred a week later during the 3rd and 4th of June, lasting nearly 30 hours. The third broke out another week later on the 10th and 11th of June and lasted for almost 40 hours. Thereafter a condition of relative order was allowed to return. The insurgent core was satisfied with its immediate achievements, i.e., (1) a strengthening of the mass organizations involved through an increase in membership, and (2) successful provocation of an international incident damaging the U.S. prestige around the world.

During each of the successive demonstrations, increased elements of the population were successively drawn into participation. Students, unionists, teachers, prominent personalities, middle-of-the-road politicians, peasants --- many of these in independently voicing their personal opinions played into Communist hands, helping to universalize the Party's own slogans.

Directly involved in the demonstrations were two key forces within the Socialist Party --- the Youth Division and the SOHYO (General Council of Japanese Trade Unions) headed by Akira Iwai. Both of these key forces also influenced the rather more moderate elements of the Socialist Party --- the Wada, Matsumoto, and Momizo factions which themselves stood considerably to the left of the remaining forces in the Socialist combination.⁴

The Youth Division had ties with the Zengakuren (Union of University Student's Self-Government Associations) which claimed 270,000 of Japan's 630,000 college students as members,⁵ and with the Nikkyoso, the main teachers' union,⁶ characterized as a "powerful and leftist-dominated union."⁷ Through Nikkyoso, a wide assortment of University faculty members could be mobilized for activities desired by those leading the demonstrations.

The Zengakuren was a product of the radical leftist period which followed the end of World War II. From the beginning the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) has played a major role in Zengakuren and two major factions claiming Marxist ideology exist within it. These are the "moderate" or "anti-mainstream" element and the "mainstream" or Trotskyite section. The latter

faction represents the extremes of leftist thought, having been expelled from the Japanese Communist Party as "too radical," (e.g., they considered Khrushchev as a traitor to the proletarian cause).

How many students take part in Zengakuren's left-wing political activities is questionable. There is a hard core of both mainstream and anti-mainstream factions that is always willing to tangle with the police in one radical cause or another. Together or separately they can bring 20,000 or more yelling snake-dancing young men and women into the streets of Tokyo on any occasion. It is well known that many, if not all, of the students turning out are paid 300 yen (about 80 cents) from the association's treasury for a good day's demonstration. 8

Even before May of 1960 Zengakuren's history was marked by political demonstrations. On 27 November 1959 more than 500 students and police were injured when members of the organization stormed the grounds of the Diet building. Several Zengakuren leaders were jailed only after they had barricaded themselves on the campus of Tokyo University for several days in defiance of the police.

The radicals next appeared in strength in January of 1960 when 700 of them wrecked the Tokyo Airport restaurant in a brawl with police sent to prevent the students from carrying out their threat to stop Premier Kishi from leaving for Washington to sign the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty.

The battling students received moral encouragement from left-wing professors who viewed open conflict with authority as the most effective means of dramatizing social conflict. ⁹ Too, the Japanese Communist Party was also engaged in the demonstrations of May and June, 1960. Although it commanded only some 2 or 3 percent of the popular vote, the JCP nevertheless enjoyed

considerable influence through its role inside labor and student groups.

In the summer of 1960, for example, the JCP joined with the Socialists to form an ad hoc "People's Council" ¹⁰ to man an organizational center for the ensuing Tokyo riots and demonstrations. (Directives from external sources, widely referred to at the time, could have been channeled through this center) ¹¹

These forces then -- students, teachers and intellectuals of the Communist-influenced and partially controlled left -- combined with the activists within Sohyo's 3,500,000 membership, provided an extremely broad, well-integrated and effectively-led force which could guarantee continuity, direction, and viability during a period of protracted political conflict.

Kishi had used force to halt Socialist obstructionism in the Diet on 19 May and he rammed through ratification of the Security Treaty early the next day. ¹² During the next five days until May 25th some 300 policemen and 200 demonstrators were injured in a series of stone-throwing clashes. ¹³ On May 29th the 26 Socialist deputies in the Diet submitted their resignations to Inejiro Asanuma, Secretary General of the Socialist Party, in an attempt to provoke the dissolution of the lower house and thus force the scheduling of new elections. Asanuma postponed any action, while Kishi steadfastly refused to quit his office until the treaty was ratified by the upper house of the Diet. ¹⁴

The 26th of May saw the first crest of demonstrations. In the morning, parades were staged in Tokyo in preparation for mass rallies in front of the Diet scheduled for the afternoon. Students and union members moved to

designated assembly areas, carrying red flags with anti-treaty and anti-Kishi slogans. Brief work stoppages were reported in government agencies and thousands of police began to deploy at sensitive points.¹⁵ By early afternoon some 150,000 demonstrators were concentrated in the city, 16,000 of them in front of the U.S. Embassy where they remained two and one-half hours. By late afternoon at least 2,000,000 persons were engaged throughout the country. In the evening, stone-throwing squads of students reappeared, injuring 23 policemen who warded them off with firehoses.¹⁶

Although comparative calm reigned the following days, activities were nevertheless well under way to prepare for a new wave of activity designed to attract more varied groups into the anti-Kishi drives. On May 29th Nikkyoso, the Teachers Union, opened its national meeting in the city of Morioka in northeastern Japan. There it was decided to launch a letter-writing campaign to be implemented by Nikkyoso's provincial subsidiaries. The object of this campaign, aimed at the U.S. Embassy, was to force the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit to Japan scheduled for June 16th. At the same time, Nikkyoso joined with the ad hoc "People's Council" for the purpose of sparking new protest rallies.¹⁷

On June 1st the Socialist leader Inejiro Asanuma accepted the resignations of his Diet colleagues. This was followed two days later by an announcement by the Socialist trade union federation SOHYO calling for a limited work stoppage on June 4th and another major rally to be staged on June 11th.¹⁸ SOHYO Secretary General Akira Kwai declared that the June 11th rally "would eclipse the annual Mayday turnout of 1,000,000 marchers."¹⁹

But the Japanese did not have to wait another week for more rioting. By June 11th, Tokyo would find itself in its third spasm of violence, the second having been triggered by the SOHYO call for a "limited work stoppage" on June 4th. That afternoon the Zengakuren-left began massive marches in prelude to the partial strike. The marchers denounced Kishi, the Security Treaty, and the Eisenhower visit. Most of the participants were satisfied with a peaceful show of strength in downtown Tokyo, but several thousands launched sit-down strikes in front of the U.S. Embassy, around the Diet building, and before the official residence of Premier Kishi.²⁰ At the Kishi residence the demonstration became bloody. A nucleus of about 70 students equipped with ropes managed to open the locked steel gates, enabling them to attack the club-swinging police within the compound. The students were evicted only after several police charges during which some 83 policemen were injured.²¹ Thirteen student leaders were arrested.

While the unionists were preparing the strike and the students were engaged in the streets, the "People's Council" deployed yet another phalanx on June 3rd. Seven hundred and eight professors and teachers at Tokyo University signed a petition demanding immediate dissolution of the Diet and the scheduling of new national elections.²²

From their demonstrations on June 3rd, some 11,200 students moved on to Tokyo's railway stations where they joined trade unionists sitting on the tracks to stop the trains from running. As a result of this demonstration, which lasted on into the next day, by the morning of June 4th Japanese trains were running some three hours late. Still another demonstration

was staged at the U.S. Embassy that afternoon for three and a half hours. A new element appeared in the presence of "many educators." ²³ Concurrently the widely-known physicist and Nobel prizewinner Dr. Hideki Yukawa issued a statement calling for Kishi's resignation as the only solution for the disturbed political situation. ²⁴

The following days before June 10th, when U.S. Presidential Press Secretary Hagerty landed at Haneda International Airport, were filled with rumors, more petitions and threats, and increased organizational work. New elements of the population were drawn into militant action in the demonstrations. The insurgent power apparatus showed increasingly effective ability to contend with the government as an equal. The population began progressively to look to the demonstrations for leadership, not to the government. A competing dual power structure had become apparent.

Mr. Hagerty, accompanied by Ambassador MacArthur, was held at Haneda Airport for 4 hours and 20 minutes by some 6,000 disciplined demonstrators.

The scene was a sea of red flags bearing the names of the Communist and Socialist Parties, various powerful labor unions, and student organizations. Placards carried English-language slogans such as "Ike and U-2 not to Japan"; "We dislike Ike"; "Take back your bases"; and "Remember Hiroshima."

The original force of some 500 Japanese policemen on duty at the airport was soon reinforced by some 1200 more who were summoned from other nearby points. "The police were ineffectual, however, before the well-drilled efforts of the demonstrators to hold the Ambassador's car immovable and to keep the circling helicopter from landing." ²⁵

At a whistle signal from a leader the students and unionists withdrew slightly from the limousine but kept it surrounded. U.S. Embassy officials and Secret Service men rushed from other cars in the caravan, which were not molested, and formed an inner human barrier around the Ambassador's automobile.

Finally, sufficient space was cleared for the helicopter to land about 50 feet from the imprisoned limousine. Two double lines of policemen formed a lane from the car to the aircraft. ²⁶

At the U.S. Embassy, Hagerty was greeted by yet another mob of 8000 which, once it learned that Hagerty was in the building, tried unsuccessfully to force its way through heavy police guards. The next day the police announced that 28 of their number had been injured at the airport while only 3 students were hurt. ²⁷

But the Hagerty incident was only a prelude to the June 11th SOHYO rally announced the preceding week by labor leader Akira Iwai. That day, a Saturday, was in its slightly less spectacular way an even bigger victory for the demonstrators. From dawn until nearly midnight the Socialist trade unionists and students effectively controlled the giant city of Tokyo. The fact that their behavior was on the whole non-violent hardly lessens the significance of the helplessness of the authorities. The demonstrators besieged the Diet and the Prime Minister's official residence next door. Under the eyes of thousands of police who guarded the barbed-wire encircled Diet building, the crowd halted a busload of supporters of Prime Minister Kishi. Some of these were manhandled. There were crowds singing and dancing

all day around the American Embassy. And a vast crowd surrounded Kishi's private home some six or seven miles away in the Shibuya district, amusing itself by painting its wooden gate red and then destroying it.

Almost forgotten amid the turmoil, Mr. Hagerty held a few conferences with Japanese officials (he met neither the Prime Minister nor the Foreign Minister) and then slipped away from his hotel in a fast car to catch his airplane which had been moved from Haneda International Airport to a U.S. airbase 35 miles outside Tokyo. ²⁸

Of the 100,000 Japanese milling through the streets, some 38,000 were persons who had come from prefectures outside of Tokyo. On that day the leaders of the demonstrations were rewarded for their unmatched organizational efficiency by a major triumph. Tokyo's Chief of Police, Zenjiro Horikiri, informed the Kishi Cabinet on June 11th that he could not guarantee President Eisenhower's safety in Japan, and that the Cabinet "had better postpone the visit." ²⁹

SINGAPORE - MAY AND JUNE 1955

Abstract. Here is an example of the mass demonstration (Model One, Form 1) executed through a system of organizations which specifically appealed to the Chinese element of the population. The techniques employed were those of Tokyo five years later, but adapted to the situation in Singapore. The counterinsurgent effort was distinct from that in Tokyo only to the extent that it was even weaker. The initiative was entirely with the insurgent forces. Terror--or better, the threat of resort to terror--and rumors played a significant role. Agit/prop, strikes and street fighting were employed in accordance with classic Communist principles.

On April 15, 1955, the beginning of Phase One urban insurgency in Singapore was marked by a strike. Two waves of activity followed. The first reached its crest during a 70-hour chaotic period from late on May 10th to early morning on May 13th. The second wave broke out in the form of a general strike some four weeks later during the period 13-16 June 1955. Noteworthy in Singapore, as in the Tokyo case of five years later, was the fact that progressively broader elements of the population were persuaded to take part as events unfolded.

At the militant center of the insurgent forces stood the Communist-inspired "Middle Road Group" -- so-called after the Singapore street where its headquarters were located. Its Secretary General was the Chinese Lim Ching-siong. In support was the Chinese school system of Singapore which funneled organizational funds through the "All-Singapore Chinese Schools Parent-Teacher Association" also headed by Lim Ching-siong. Student participation was directed from the Chung-Ching High School, but the Hua-Chiao High School was also a center of importance. In November 1954 the

number of avenues through which the Middle Road Group sought to influence the people was increased by the establishment of two more organizations. The People's Action Party (PAP), the first of these, campaigned on a platform of immediate independence for Singapore, and sent the same Mr. Lim Ching-siong to parliament as one of its representatives. The Factory and Shop Workers' Union (FSU), a radical aggressive organization, also dates from November.. Initially it was quite small. By April 1955, after a six months' existence, it had attracted but 7,000 members. Because of its ability to tap the manpower resources of these several parallel organizations, however, the Middle Road Group was readily able to provide itself with ample strong-arm squads, agit/prop teams, organization bureaus, and the other traditional accoutrements of organized subversion.

Organizationally linked with the students, trade unionists, and the politically receptive Chinese population-at-large in Singapore, Lim Ching-siong's apparatus had provided itself with the structural basis needed to build a dual power system which could be used to isolate the formal government and its administrative offices from the general citizenry. That this process was in motion is attested by the assertion on 16 May 1955 of David Marshall, Singapore's Chief Minister, to the effect that "school principals are frightened -- frightened that if they thwart Malayan Communist Party influence in their schools, they will be assassinated." ³⁰

The activities of April and May 1955 were aimed at the achievement of limited objectives far short of any outright seizure of power. It is reasonable to assume that the Middle Road Group was aware of the forces available to the

British authorities -- forces more than adequate to forestall a projected coup d'etat. The fact is that during the period under analysis no attempts were made to seize power stations, administrative buildings, radio stations, or other crucial centers. The insurgent mission must be reconstructed from an analysis of the course of events and the results achieved. In this light, the mission seems to have been modest. The series of events over a two-month period can be viewed simply as an initial step in a protracted conflict which might take several years to achieve its end -- the accession to power of the Middle Road Group. The immediate objective was organizational work, the expansion of membership of the student, labor, and political mass organizations of the Middle Road Group's apparatus. Too, the Middle Road Group's own membership would grow as well as, using the slogan of "independence now," that group would demonstrate the impotence of Marshall's government to meet the provocation of an extra-legal political challenge.

Involved in the situation were the concurrent parallel "constructive-destructive" operations central to protracted revolutionary warfare. The destructive aspects consisted of the undermining of recognized political, economic, and customary authorities. From the revolutionary point of view, the activities were constructive in that they provided an alternative institutional pattern for those cut loose from undermined traditional institutions. This alternative pattern would be aggressive and expanding. It would complete the establishment of a dual power system. Singapore, then, in the early summer of 1955 provides a textbook example of essential principles of insurgency as applicable within a totally urban environment.

On 15 April the FSU went on strike at the Hock Lee Amalgamated Bus Company, crippling commuter transportation in Singapore. There followed a period of increasingly severe clashes in which students played a prominent role. Emotional demonstrations broke out on May 1st. On the 10th the police turned high-pressure hoses on throngs of strikers and students, succeeding in blocking the gates of the bus depot while company-oriented workers drove some of the buses away. Mobs then began to collect, resulting in the hectic demonstrations of May 11th, 12th, and 13th during which the police suffered severe casualties and many persons, Chinese and Europeans, were wounded or killed. This was, however, no spontaneous uprising, nor was it comparable to the 1948 Bogotazo. "All Thursday (May 12th) afternoon truckloads of students scurried about the city taunting police and inciting the workers."³¹ David Marshall charged in the Singapore legislature four days later that "seventeen truckloads of students were ferried to one single critical center in the city that day."³²

The police proved inadequate to the challenge. British troops and Gurkhas poured into the streets on the morning of May 13th, whereupon Marshall announced the closing of Chung-Ching and Hua-Chiao schools. But Marshall moved without providing himself the means of enforcing his policy. When the grounds of Chung-Ching were filled by students, nothing was done to force them to leave. A sit-down strike at the school was supported by threats to the government that if the ban was not lifted 700,000 workers would march on Marshall's office. Marshall apparently believed in the FSU's ability to mobilize such a force and retreated.³³

The Chinese schools were reopened on May 18th -- a major victory for the Middle Road Group which had now shown its ability to coerce the government. That day "students danced and chanted in a marathon celebration. Communist control of the school was stronger than it had ever been." ³⁴ But it was not solely in the Chinese schools that Communist strength had grown. By the beginning of June membership of the FSU jumped from the April figure of 7000 to 17,000. Agitation among the population continued as did the harassment of the government.

The second wave of demonstrations began on June 7th with a strike of the FSU against two foreign-owned plants. As during the first phase of operations, the labor union move was quickly supported by increased student agitation and provocation. Again, the city's buses disappeared from the streets. "PAP organizers, mostly students, fanned out across the city." ³⁵ New was a series of sympathy strikes by other Singapore unions which started, one after the other, on Monday, June 13th. By June 15th, 10,000 workers were on strike.

The Marshall government responded to the new wave of strikes by arresting some eight members of the Middle Road Group. But Lim Ching-siong was left at liberty in accordance with the constitutional stipulation guaranteeing assemblymen immunity from arrest. Orders to arrest another 100 members of the Communist apparatus were withdrawn before they could be carried out. Such limited steps have no significant effect upon insurgent operations. The more orderly course of events in June was the result of a deliberate Communist decision against resort to mass violence. The Communists were satisfied

that they had "demonstrated that they could tie up the city at will." ³⁶ They held "absolute domination over the Chinese schools." ³⁷ The membership of the FSU had climbed to 24,000 -- only eight months after its organization! (One year later, the FSU would have a membership of 100,000.) And finally, an even more extensive band of subsidiary and auxiliary mass organizations had come into being. ³⁸ By June 17th workers began to return to work. The tactical objectives of the Middle Road Group had been achieved. During the following months it would direct its attention primarily towards digesting the new wealth of manpower which had resulted from successful operations.

PANAMA CITY, JANUARY 1964

Abstract. This was an attempt at the "popular" mass demonstration (Model One, Form 1) by a cadre organization less disciplined and less effective in organizational work than is apparent in either Tokyo (1960) or Singapore (1955), but theoretically well grounded in the principles and procedures to be employed in this form of overt activity. There was no counterinsurgent response, save in the Canal Zone proper, for some seventy hours. An attempt was made to compensate for the low level of organizational work—reflected in the sharp decline in the size of the participating groups after the first day—by directing greater attention to psychological operations via the press and radio.

The brevity of events in Panama is accounted for in part by the nature of their main target -- the United States, not the government of the country in which the insurgents operated. And with respect to the United States, there could have been no question of forcing it from the Canal Zone either by building a dual power system of mass organizations in the Zone, by establishing effective control over existing socio-economic or political associations in the Zone, or through an attempted coup d'etat. None of these alternatives -- which had influenced the subversive strategies plotted in Singapore and Tokyo -- applied in Panama. The only meaningful goal that an organization such as the VAN (Vanguardia de Accion Nacional -- generally accredited with providing the leadership of the January 1964 demonstration) might have expected under the circumstances was the embarrassment of the U.S. in a situation where its freedom of response was hindered by international considerations. Thus for reasons quite different from those which affected insurgent planners in Singapore and Tokyo, Panamanian insurgents nonetheless also settled for limited objectives. It is important, however, to emphasize

that techniques employed to achieve limited ends in Panama conformed to the patterns followed by insurgents elsewhere. Although the VAN was not, for example, directing its attacks against its home government, it could still expand its membership, attract student elements to its domination, and strengthen the hand of Communist-influenced union leaders by showing its ability to engage the Americans successfully. Thus the VAN provided itself, in an organizational sense, with exactly those instruments needed for the establishment of a dual power structure in Panama City. VAN's enhanced position in the Panamanian political power structure as a result of agitation against the outside power hinged, then, not simply on the popularity of the cause it espoused, but, importantly, on a significant expansion of its organizational base in Panamanian society.

It has been mentioned that VAN is generally credited with providing the leadership of the January 1964 demonstrations in Panama. A total of 15 of its members, including Cesar Carrasquilla, were identified as prominent participants during the several days of disturbances.^{39 40} Among them there were individuals who had received training in Cuba as recently as 1962.⁴¹ Some also had been to the USSR and/or Red China.⁴² In addition, however, persons from the Partido del Pueblo -- the orthodox Soviet-oriented communist party in Panama -- also took part in the riots.^{43 44} These included Floyd Britton, Virginia Ramirez, Huberto Bruggiati, and Alberto Calvo. Both of these groups were active in student organizations. Carrasquilla of VAN, was active in the Instituto Nacional, a technical high school, is one example. Calvo of the PDP, active in the University of Panama,

is another. A hard core of some 400 students from these institutions played persistent roles in the January 1964 affair. In addition, a body of some 3,000 persons took some part in the demonstrations -- primarily on the first day.⁴⁵ In part they came from Panama's leftist labor unions.

The popular issues publicly espoused by the demonstrators were the flying of the Panamanian flag in the Canal Zone and the renegotiation of the Canal Treaty with the United States. But from the point of view of the leaders of the affair, the more important objectives were tactical and political in nature. Both the VAN and the PDP sought to goad U.S. troops into firing on Panamanians to substantiate charges of "aggression." They also exerted themselves to force concessions from the U.S. which, though they might appear insignificant, could be interpreted locally as a blow to U.S. prestige and thus increase the stature of the demonstration leaders. (The eventual agreement to fly the Panamanian flag in front of the Zone's Tivoli Hotel falls into this category.)

The Canal Zone incident and its subsequent events occurred in a country already familiar with leftist-inspired disturbances such as the student riots of 1958 and 1959 and the Cerro Tute uprising of April, 1959.⁴⁶ Signs of increased tension within the population were already visible again in October 1963 and the Panamanian Government was informed in December of that year that the VAN organization planned violent demonstrations during January 1964. But the Chiari government, facing elections in the near future, hesitated to act. An issue was needed for the elections and the flag pole affair of January 9th supplied it.

Four hours after the Panamanian students, bearing their torn national flag, were expelled from the Canal Zone, the insurgents had a mob on the streets. Even two hours earlier (6:30 p.m.) the students had been joined by older men near the border. There followed a night of wanton destruction, with the National Guard failing to intervene and restore order.⁴⁷ A number of large structures in the city were burned -- the Canal Zone Bus Service Terminal,⁴⁸ the Pan American Building,⁴⁹ several office and storage buildings, and the Cristobal YMCA. Molotov cocktails^{50 51 52} and other fire bombs were heavily used that night and the following day. At about 10:30 p.m. on January 9th, sniper fire into the Canal Zone began.⁵³ On January 10th it was supported by fire from automatic weapons -- a situation which continued during January 11th and 12th.

But as the use of firearms increased, the size of the mobs significantly decreased. Instead of large groups of a thousand or more milling through the streets, small groups of 75 to 200⁵⁴ became characteristic. During January 10th, 11th, and 12th, groups of this size repeatedly tried to penetrate the Canal Zone. The one exception in which a larger body gathered after January 10th took place near the Thatcher Ferry Bridge in Balboa at noon on the eleventh.

The reverse of what had happened in Singapore and Tokyo was happening in Panama. The organizers of the demonstrations clearly could not sustain their success by drawing in increased elements of the population. If the events in Panama were distinct from those of the Bogotazo in that they

displayed some advance planning and coordination, they were equally distinct from their two oriental counterparts in lack of flexibility and effective organizational work at the grass roots. Had Panamanian security forces promptly intervened the demonstrations would surely have been suppressed by the second day. If the affair was successful for the insurgents in presenting the United States with an embarrassing situation, it nevertheless remained little more than a field exercise for a command cadre yet to attain professionalism.

Form Two: The Spontaneous Uprising

THE BOGOTAZO (COLOMBIA), APRIL 1948

Abstract. This constitutes the genuinely spontaneous demonstration (Model One, Form 2) sparked by an incident of an unpremeditated character to which the populace responded instinctively with a wave of destruction. The uprising lacked both direction and clearly articulated political content. The prompt response of security forces checked the uprising within twenty-four hours in the urban area of Bogota. The urban disturbances were succeeded by an extended period of increased rural banditry which evolved out of the chaotic conditions of the immediate post-Bogotazo period, but which stood in no coordinated relationship to the urban disturbances and displayed no signs of unified command. (For the situation in which the escalation of rural activities are coordinated with the urban uprising, see Model Three: Malaya, Singapore and Hanci.)

Involved in the violent events of 9 April 1948 which have been called the Bogotazo (freely translated, the "blow at Bogota") was a cross section of the Colombian population — elements of organized labor involved in recent strike actions; unemployed or underemployed city dwellers and displaced peasants from the countryside seeking greater security in the cities; and campesinos (peasant farmers) still under the rule of agrarian patrones or gamonales (bosses). But more fortunate elements of society also took part. Members of the Liberal Party joined elements of the police ⁵⁵ (e.g., the Fifth Police Division), who not only fought along with the other groups against the remaining security forces but who also served as a source of arms supply for the mob.

In the Communist camp, members of the "Federation of University Students" -- in session at the time in Bogota -- were involved as well as ordinary members of the Communist Party. It was generally held in Colombia at the time that the Communist Party intended to take the leadership in sabotaging the meeting of the Inter-American Conference,⁵⁶ and the remarks of Secretary General Gilberto Viera, three weeks before the Bogotazo lent seeming confirmation. He had said: "My party considers that... the country needs a full revolutionary battle of the working class and the people."⁵⁷ Yet while the Communist Party did participate, there is no evidence that it either sparked the uprising (i.e., was involved in the death of Gaitan) or exerted meaningful influence over the course of events.

It has also been charged that external Communists were involved.⁵⁸ Thus after the Bogotazo, President Perez issued a statement charging that "professional agitators with express orders from Moscow" were responsible for the outbreak.⁵⁹ The President used this assertion as his justification for breaking diplomatic relations with the USSR. Circumstantial evidence suggesting Moscow's possible involvement in one way or another might be drawn from the fact that its Bogota embassy evacuated the bulk of its classified files to Caracas, Venezuela, during the months of February and March 1948, and then burn its remaining classified materials the first week of April.⁶⁰ But regardless of the role played by Communists, domestic or foreign, the fact is that the Bogotazo was not conducted through a system of mass or front organizations integrated under the leadership and control of a dissident organization bent upon the execution of a real socio-economic revolution. Liberals of both the Gaitanistas and the more moderate branch

did identify with labor groups and did call for agrarian reforms, but they lacked a conspiratorial tradition in the totalitarian vein. They sought no social convulsion and in fact were really committed to a program of evolutionary change. The Communist Party -- which did seek to set up an apparatus of dual power -- was ineffectual in its efforts. This ineffectuality was illustrated by the brevity of the demonstration as well as its low political content. This lack of staying power, in contrast to the extended incident patterns in Tokyo, Singapore, and Panama City, is one of the fundamental characteristics of the Bogotazo.

Behind the events of April 9th lay an extended series of defeats for Colombia's reformist elements. Organized labor had been held in check and was suffering from ruinous urban inflation.⁶¹ Political reform had been rejected at the polls in 1946 when the supporters of reformist Jorge Eliécer Gaitan split the Liberal Party, permitting the election of Mariano Ospina Perez who represented only a minority of the citizenry. The rural population remained in a depressed condition, controlled by rival patrones and subjected to the depredations of criminal bands.⁶²

In April 1947 Gaitan wrote an editorial "No mas sangre" (No more blood), and presented a memorial to the President asking for effective government action to end violence in the countryside. He received no response.

During the latter half of 1947 numerous incidents were reported in: Monquirá -- 6 dead, 12 or more wounded; Villanueva -- 22 dead; Arauca -- 30 killed; Ceilan hamlet in Valle del Cauca -- 150 dead; San Rafael -- 27 killed; Cali reported that an unarmed audience was attacked by armed men including secret agents and police officers. A number were killed.

February 7, 1948, the Liberal Party held 3 demonstrations in urban centers to protest the violence and the forced migration of rural populations in Manizales, Peneira, and Bogota. Those in Manizales and Peneira ended in violence. That in Bogota, however, was impressive by its peaceful nature. A crowd of 100,000 stood in silence in the Plaza de Bolivar, waving handkerchiefs as they listened to Gaitan's moving plea for peace and justice and to his protest against alleged police persecution.⁶³

In February there was labor unrest, including strikes and sabotage throughout the country. In March, disappointed by government inaction, Gaitan withdrew Liberal ministers from the cabinet. By March 11, students attacked the Ministry of Education in Bogota. As a final frustration, the Conservative President struck at Gaitan's pride by failing to appoint him as a delegate to the Inter-American Conference.⁶⁴

The assassination of Gaitan by an obscure taxi driver without any demonstrable relationship to the Communist Party at noon on April 9th, 1948, ignited this combustible situation. But it is important that mob action spent itself in less than 24 hours. Police of the Fifth Division barricaded themselves in their headquarters building and held out until the night of April 10th. A few snipers were still active in Bogota as late as April 11th and some looting and burning took place later,⁶⁵ but the Army units deployed in the city had generally reestablished order by midday on April 10th.

In contrast to the Panamanian disturbances 16 years later, the smaller groups of 75 to 200 which would keep the pot boiling from the 10th through the 13th of January 1964 did not put in an appearance in Bogota -- a clear indication of lack of organization even in the rudimentary form it was to assume in Panama. In fact, the only step taken

to sustain the urban demonstration in Bogota was the declaration of a general strike of all workers throughout Colombia by the "Confederation of Colombia workers," which represented approximately 109,000 of the 165,000 organized workers of the country. And with the national army on the alert, this effort constituted no serious threat.

During the hours of most intense activity, mobs looted liquor stores, burned the Palacio de Justicia and other government buildings, opened jails allowing the escape of convicts and the destruction of prison records, dynamited the conservative newspaper El Siglo, and sacked and burned churches⁶⁶ "closely interlocked in the public mind with the conservative oligarchy."⁶⁷ Radio stations were seized, and subsequent broadcasts encouraged the mob to loot hardware stores for arms and instructed them in the manufacture of Molotov cocktails. The broadcasts failed, however, to articulate a political program or to enunciate slogans calculated to sustain more extensive operations.

The absence of an aggressive political message in the Bogotazo can be seen as the counterpart to the lack of a dual power organization, for these two phenomena are mutually interdependent. In the light of his agitation and propaganda the insurgent conducts organizational work; and through the expansion of his organizational base, he broadens the audience reached by his message.

In the wake of military pacification in Bogota, President Perez declared a state of siege and, later, martial law, imposed strict censorship, and issued his accusation against the Soviet Union. Also, on April 10th he announced his reestablishment of a coalition government similar to the one that had broken down the month before. Six Liberal ministers reentered the government.⁶⁸ But if order was quickly

restored in Bogota. this was not the case in the countryside where the traditional resort to la violencia stretched well back into the 19th century. Especially during the period 1948-1953 "violence was at its height."⁶⁹ This situation was compounded by the intensified rivalry between Liberals and Conservatives -- a rivalry which could not be resolved simply by the formula of setting up bi-party coalitions in Bogota. The release of criminal and bandit leaders from jails the night of April 9th also encouraged disorder, for they returned to their rural environs to compound the difficulties encountered by the Armed Forces in maintaining order. Estimates of deaths and injuries in rural areas during the period from 1949 to 1958 range as high as 180,000. It is clear that Communist guerrillas have been involved, notably Roberto Gonzales Prieto, who led bands in Tolima and Cajamarca in the period 1959-1963 and who is known to have spent time in Cuba in the early 1960's. But it is also apparent that such elements neither provided overall coordination for rural dissidence nor conceived of this as a means of continuing any urban insurgency initiated in Bogota in 1948. The low political content and the absence of coordination between armed groups pointedly indicates that the crisis of law and order in Colombia has not arisen in consequence of protracted revolutionary warfare, and that no calculated relationship exists between the Bogotazo -- essentially a spontaneous uprising -- and the chaotic conditions which later developed in rural Colombia.

THE KAREN UPRISING IN RANGOON, BURMA - JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1949

Abstract. This was a spontaneous urban uprising without integrated leadership or a broad political platform (Model One, Form 2). The distinguishing characteristics were the ethnic homogeneity of the participants and the general condition of disorder in the country provoked by a nationwide insurgency that had commenced the preceding summer. The lack of preplanning is indicated by (1) the totally defensive character of the Karens' military operations once loyal security forces responded and (2) their failure to make common cause with groups already in rebellion and draw them into the city to support their operations. The counterinsurgent reaction was essentially limited to military action and took the form of the encirclement and reduction of the disaffected urban and suburban areas.

At the beginning of January 1949, the government of U Nu at Rangoon, Burma, was faced by a governmental crisis of national proportions. This involved concurrent insurrections by at least four distinct groups: (1) the Burmese Communist Party (BCP), known as the "White Flags"; (2) the separate and organizationally independent Communist Party of Burma (CPB), known popularly as the "Red Flags"; (3) the rebel elements of Aung San's old militia association, the "People's Volunteer Organization" (PVO), which had broken up into political factions after independence; and (4) mutinous regular Army groups.

At that point the issue of ethnic or minority rights was of no consequence.⁷⁰ Numbers of people from such groups as the Shans, Karens, Indians, and Kachins could be found on both sides of the fight -- among the insurgents and within government forces. Thus some of the best trained units among the loyal Armed Forces were drawn from the Chins, Karens, and Kachins.

The Commander-in-chief of the Army was the Karen Lt. General Smith-Dun who also commanded the national police forces. At the same time, ethnic Burman military elements (e.g., the 3rd Burma Rifles) could be found in the insurgent camp. Indeed, during the early stages of the uprising, U Nu had been especially dependent upon the six battalions of Karen and Kachin Rifles who had recaptured Prome, Thayetmyo, and Pyinmana for the government. ⁷¹

However, if hostilities between ethnic groups did not significantly influence the course of events during the critical months of the latter half of 1948, then the seeds from which racial rivalry might spring did exist in a latent form -- an inheritance from the earlier colonial period. The Karens had enjoyed favored treatment by the British. Their preeminence in important administrative and especially military posts was a reflection of past colonial policy. Again, a substantial portion of the Karens were Christian (about 15%) and a history of provincial and local hostilities, stretching well back into the 19th century, carried over into the post-independence period. ⁷²

In all likelihood it was the fear that Karen-Burman relations might deteriorate that helped provoke open conflict. The settlements of Karens in Rangoon, Basein, Moulmein, Thaton, and other sensitive areas created apprehensions.

The cause célèbre for the Karen uprising was the murder of 80 Karen villagers on Christmas Eve 1948 in the Mergui area, followed by the bombardment of a Karen village 40 miles north of Rangoon by auxiliary police and pro-government PVO elements in mid-January of 1949. ⁷³

The Karen response in the Rangoon area came on the 31st of January, following by several days an ineffective clash at Basein. It broke out with clashes at Kawegyan and Kyaikkala-- villages in the Thamaing suburb of Rangoon -- creating panic in the city and within the administration.⁷⁴ It spread to the Karen population of Ahlone and Insein (the former an area within Rangoon, the latter a key town immediately north of the city limits) when government forces moved into these areas looking for arms.⁷⁵ Flying columns next raided the Mingaladon Air Force Armory, carrying off arms and ammunition.

Ahlone was retaken by government forces first, after the area was purposely set ablaze.⁷⁶ Kawegyan and Kyaikkala were largely under government control by February 11th, following heavy bombardment from mortars, field and naval artillery, and aircraft.⁷⁷ But the resistance in the Insein-Gyogon area was broken only after a siege of 112 days. On 22 May the Karens finally retreated north across the Hlaing River.⁷⁸

Several distinctive characteristics of this uprising should be noted. First: despite the bloodshed, the heavy fire fights, and the length of time needed to restore order, the Karen uprising remained essentially a demonstration. At no time was it conceived by its leaders as stage one in a seizure of power in Rangoon. This fact is underlined by the ease with which the Kachin, Captain Naw Seng, persuaded the mutinous Karen Rifles -- once he had thrown in his lot with the Karen insurrection-- to march, not to Thamaing and Insein to break the siege and carry the city of Rangoon, but north to occupy the region from Pyinmana to Mandalay -- a strategy utterly irrelevant to the uprising in Rangoon.⁷⁹

Secondly, the spontaneous character of this demonstration should be stressed. As it unfolded it became obvious that no prior contingency planning and, most importantly, no substantial political program had been prepared. It was "essentially a communal rather than a political manifestation of the fear of Burman rule."⁸⁰ At no time was an effort made to appeal to major segments of the national population. Not even a rudimentary effort was made to set up a dual power structure, despite the fact that concurrent Communist tactics provided examples enough of the procedures to be employed. The "Karen National Defense Organization" (KNDO) was conceived by its members as essentially a military organization. They did not attempt to generalize its message for national consumption. When the BCP attempted to draw the KNDO into its "People's Front Government" at Prome — a genuine attempt to establish a dual power structure in February 1950 — the effort failed.⁸¹

Again, the Karens failed to exploit the collection of Anglo-Burmese, Indians, Chinese, and Burmans who fell fortuitously into their hands in the Insein-Gyogon area at the beginning of the siege. Instead of using the civil population to establish a Karen-controlled "National Front," they responded to a government pamphlet dropped from a Burmese Air Force plane asking civilians to evacuate the area by allowing some 3,000 persons to proceed across to Rangoon peacefully "in trucks and buses and by river."⁸² Here, then, was an example of urban disorder more closely related to that at Bogota in 1948 than to the demonstrations at Singapore in 1955, Tokyo in 1960, or Panama City in 1964.

DEPARTMENT OF SETIF, ALGERIA, MAY 1945

Abstract. This spontaneous demonstration was conducted by a colonial people who were provided with a political program of broad appeal, i.e., "independence," but who were without the equipment, planning or organization requisite to assert themselves in the face of the firepower and political determination of their colonial administration and the resident French population. The extremely severe measures of repression employed by the French community, both military and civil, dichotomized Algerian society and established the a priori for the later protracted revolutionary war in which the Algerian cities would again play a significant, if altered, role. (For examples of urban activities as support operations for rural insurgency, see Model Four: Cuba, the FLN, Nairobi and Athens.)

The phenomenon of a highly polarized citizenry—on a racial basis in Burma between Burmans and Karens in January 1949, on a political basis between Liberals and Conservatives in Colombia leading to the 1948 Bogotazo—existed also in Algeria on a racial-economic-political basis in 1945. The European element had acquired control of industry, commerce, and agriculture and was able to withhold political authority from indigenous political and intellectual elites. It successfully frustrated all efforts to ameliorate the economic hardships of the masses. Despite the absence of these racial and colonial factors in the Colombian situation under analysis, the emotional state of the masses in Bogota could best be compared with the spirited hostility among Algerians in Setif. Where racial and cultural distinctions served to sharpen the division of Algerian society, the tradition of fraternal slaughter, assassination, and wanton destruction in Colombia surpassed that in Algeria in both degree and duration, assuring an abiding intense dichotomy in the Colombian society.

Political parties in both countries reflected this split. In Algeria the colons were unified by a sustained fear of growing Muslim power. Among the Muslims there existed several legally tolerated western-type political organizations. (Within the Colombian Liberal combination distinct factions could likewise be identified, especially the Gaitanistas) The most prominent Muslim parties were the Algerian People's Party (PPA), La Federation des Elus Musulmans d'Algerie, and the Association of Ulemas. In 1944 these combined to form the Amis du Manifeste Algerien (AMA) with a combined membership of about 500,000.

Again, as in Colombia and Burma, neither the AMA nor any of its constituent parts had taken steps to create a dual power apparatus such as existed in Singapore in 1955, Tokyo in 1960, or Panama City in 1964. Equally important was the fact that the Algerian parties at this time did not place major reliance upon clandestine organization or subversive activities. The OS (Organization Secrete) was formed by the MTLD (Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertes Democratiques), the successor to the PPA, only after 1948. At the close of World War II the membership of the AMA sought reform and a redress of grievances through evolutionary, legal, and constitutional means.

The events leading to the demonstration of May 1945 saw their origins in De Gaulle's return to Algeria during World War II. In response to his request for Muslim Algerian participation in the war on the side of France, he was presented with a manifesto demanding that France recognize a priori the distinct personality of the Muslim Algerian. The manifesto spoke of the application of the right of self-determination to all countries, large

or small. It called for agrarian reform, free compulsory education, the recognition of Arabic as an official language, and the promulgation of a constitution which would give the Muslims immediate and effective participation in the government of their country.

De Gaulle responded with an edict enacting an expanded version of the old Blum-Violette plan which had been blocked by colon agitation in 1936. What De Gaulle offered mainly was progressive assimilation. Sixteen categories of Muslims were admitted to French citizenship (60,000 persons) without having to forgoe their special status under Islamic law. One million and a half Muslim males over 21 years of age received the right to vote within the Second College (a bicameral legislative assembly composed of a First College of colons and Muslims having French citizenship and a Second College of non-French Algerians). Muslim representation in the French Chamber of Deputies in Paris was also offered along with the right to elect 40% of the members of the city and regional councils and the financial delegations.

In Muslim eyes, these provisions were inadequate, particularly in the light of the declarations of the "Atlantic Charter" dealing with the rights of peoples to self-determination as well as the Roosevelt-Sultan Mohammed V discussions about the future of North Africa. Both of these developments were interpreted by nationalist leaders as indications that the United States supported independence for all North Africa. Dissatisfaction with de Gaulle's response provided the political background for the Setif demonstrations which began ostensible as a celebration of VE Day, but deteriorated into a mass uprising lasting one day.

This uprising was quickly broken by security forces unhampered--as were the British in Singapore--by constitutional restrictions on available courses of action. As at Rangoon, aerial, naval, and field artillery bombardments were employed. Unlike the Burmese incident, however, casualties in Algeria were high. Officially they ran from 1,500 to 6,000. Unofficially they may have amounted to several tens of thousands. The French relied on classical precedents for the suppression of tribal uprisings by making an example of those who demonstrated at Setif. The military response was followed in subsequent weeks by legal steps. Nationalist parties were banned, mass arrests made, and extensive trials initiated. Concurrently the colons were permitted to take reprisals in their role as a police auxiliary force.

The result was an even more complete polarization of Algerian society. Richard Brace, writing in 1960, had this to say on the meaning of Setif:

Today Algerian nationalist leaders consider the events of May, 1945, to be of capital importance. The revolution of 1954 was decided upon at the time of the events of 1945. All nationalist leaders I met at Cairo, Tunis, Bonn, Rome, and Geneva pointed to the delusion of the nights and the days of May.⁸³

Form Three: Terrorism as a Form of Urban Insurgency

The activities of Jewish terrorists in Palestine during 1938 and 1939 (exemplified by the Irgun Zvai Leumi) illustrate another major subdivision within the general category of urban demonstrations undertaken without the intention to seize power or precipitate a protracted revolutionary war whose center of gravity is intended to shift to the rural area. These activities illustrate those operations conducted clandestinely or illegally by an organization or organizations unable to achieve legal status or to establish open political associations or front organizations.

As in the case of Palestine in 1938 and 1939, Fidel Castro's armed attack on the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba on 26 July 1953, and the French OAS in 1961-63, the "criminal" label attached to the insurgents to estrange them from the population was remarkably difficult to shake off. Unquestionably there were substantial elements in the population who, for example, were sympathetic to the aims sought by the Irgun. And the Irgun itself was ideologically based and equipped with effective slogans and a well-articulated political program. Yet the Irgun's activities had only limited impact.

Among the reasons for this relatively limited impact of insurgent activity in Palestine was the fact that much of the Irgun's influence was diluted by the stand taken by the officially-tolerated Haganah, or Jewish Community Defense Force. Although a small element of Haganah actively worked against Arab terrorism (called the "Arab Revolt," 1937-39) officially the Jews adopted the policy of Havlagah (restraint). Aside from this dilution of effort, however, the primary problem faced by the Irgun at that time was

the weakness inherent in an organization's being restricted to activities of an illegal character, the justification of which cannot be defended in any public forum.

Blackmail, bank robberies, terror, intimidation, bombings, assassinations, indiscriminate slaughter by small bands in urban areas -- certainly these techniques figure in every insurgency. But the lesson of Palestine and Algeria suggests that to rely upon direct attacks on these tactics without making proper allowances for political-organizational work among urban residents is to ignore just that aspect of revolutionary warfare which proves most difficult for security forces to solve.

The literature of international communism sheds much light on the issue of terrorism. A document drafted in Moscow in 1953 and circulated among members of the central committee of the Indian Communist Party during the 3rd Congress of the Party at Madurai in December of that year warns of the political danger of an overemphasis of terrorism. The following passage was copied from the original handwritten manuscript:

The objective of individual terrorism is to destroy particular individuals while not pursuing the aims of destroying the regime of feudal exploitation and subjugation of the people, whereas the objective of the partisan struggle is not to destroy particular individuals, but to destroy the hated regime in a prolonged struggle of the popular masses. In the second place, individual terrorism is carried out by individuals -- terrorists -- or by small squads of terrorists, acting apart from the masses, and without any link with the struggle of the masses, whereas the partisan struggle is carried out by popular masses and not by individuals, is carried in close contact with the struggle of the masses against the existing regime.

Since individual terrorism is carried out not by the masses but by individual terrorists acting apart from the masses, individual terrorism leads to the undue minimization of the role of the mass movement and to equally undue exaggeration of the role of the terrorists who are alleged to be capable of securing the liberation of the people by their own forces independent of the growth of the mass partisan movement. It is clear that such a feeling created by individual terrorism can only cultivate 'passivity among the popular masses and thereby undermine the development of partisan struggles.' 84

Examined in succession are the several cases noted above.

THE IRGUN ZWEI LEUMI (PALESTINE), 1938 AND 1939

Abstract. Here was an attempt to force a political decision of international import through the use of terror (Model One, Form 3), with no effective political organizational work on the overt level. The effort was further hobbled from a publically tolerated, political group of the same ethnic source which relied upon legal means of protest and rejected a policy of force. The situation was complicated by open hostility between ethnic segments of the population (Arab versus Jew) and by the fact that the government and administration were in the hands of yet a third, alien, element: the British colonial administration. Terrorism took the form of indiscriminate bombings, combined with persistent attempts upon public buildings and broadcasting facilities. The counterinsurgent effort, while it utilized both police and military forces, was climaxed by the political negotiations leading to a truce in the autumn of 1939.

As the Mandatory Power, Britain was caught between the League of Nations requirements that she implement the 1917 Balfour Declaration and provide a "National Home" for Jews in Palestine, and the limited absorptive capacity of Palestine which was already inhabited by Arabs. The British policy of limiting both Jewish immigration and the sale of Arab lands to Jews was unsatisfactory to both sides. Nevertheless the British White Paper of 17 May 1939 did limit Jewish immigration to 75,000 for the five year period 1939-1944, after which it was to stop without Arab approval. The sale of Arab land to Jews was limited or, in some cases, prohibited. This White Paper was a deliberate mollification of the Arabs on the eve of World War II, but it managed to infuriate both sides, although the Arabs might have been less furious than the Jews.

In the face of the terror resulting from the so-called "Arab Revolt" of 1937-39 the Jewish community's policy of Havlagah did, however, preserve continuing if not cordial communications between Palestine Jews and the Mandatory authorities.

The events under analysis in this study date from the major Jewish protest demonstrations -- of a peaceful character -- upon the execution of a young Jewish terrorist, Shlomo Ben Josef (29 June 1938) who had blown up an Arab bus in retaliation for the alleged murder of 4 Jewish men and the alleged rape-murder of a Jewish girl by Arabs. Marches and demonstrations were concentrated in four urban areas:

1. Haifa, chief port and industrial center, is the most important urban center in Palestine. As such it attracted many Jewish immigrants to compete economically with older Arab residents. (In 1941 the population was estimated to contain 57,100 Jews, 33,800 Muslims, and 23,500 Christians) Its divided enclaves and its position as port of entry for Jewish immigrants made Haifa particularly incident-prone.
2. Acre's importance as a port has largely been supplanted by Haifa in modern times. In the period under review it was an Arab town of only about 9,800, but it contained an important prison in which Shlomo Ben Josef was executed.
3. Jaffa-TelAviv is a single urban complex in which Jaffa is the old Arab city (estimated in 1941 to contain 47,000 Muslims, 23,800 Jews, 14,500 Christians). TelAviv is the modern northern

extension of Jaffa which formed the cultural capital of Palestine Jews. Its 1941 estimated population of 141,000 contained almost one-third of the Palestine Jews at the start of World War II.

4. Jerusalem was the administrative center of the Palestine Mandate as well as the holy city of the Jews and the Christians and an important holy place for the Muslim Arabs. Its estimated population of 141,000 in 1941 included 85,700 Jews, 29,000 Muslims, and 26,300 Christians. The old walled city was largely Arab but contained a Jewish enclave. The new city was largely Jewish.

The Jewish communities had been provided with a martyr, in the person of Shlomo Ben Josef. His execution brought into action for the first time the Irgun Zvai Leumi, or National Military Organization. At first this organization consisted of a hard core of about twenty, headed by one Vladimir Jabotinsky. It was the military arm of the Revisionist Party which did not accept the nonviolent tactics of the other Zionist parties. These accepted direction from the World Zionist Organization, while the Revisionists did not. The Revisionists were also known as the New Zionist Organization, and believed that Jews should immediately set up a Provisional Government for both Palestine and Transjordan, and that the British should be forced to evacuate the area by a campaign of terror and sabotage. By 1939 the Irgun had increased its hard core to about 30, with perhaps 100 followers who in turn could mobilize still larger groups.

Jabotinsky was able to select his future terrorists in part from certain paramilitary youth groups such as the Eret Trumpeldor (Betar -- founded by Jabotinsky in 1923 in Poland and in Palestine), the National Cells (ostensibly a discussion group), and the Maccabees (a sports and physical culture group of the Central Zionist Party).

The first terrorist act of Jabotinsky's group took place in February of 1939 when land mines, concealed under piles of fruit and vegetables, were simultaneously exploded in Arab markets in Jerusalem, Haifa, and Jaffa. Seventy-four Arabs were killed and 129 wounded. As a cover story, the Irgun publically charged the Arabs with perpetration of the act in order to incite Arab against Jew.

Activities stepped up again during May and June of 1939. On May 17th the Palestine Broadcasting Stations were bombed to prevent the broadcasting of the British Government's White Paper which attempted a permanent definition of Jewish rights in Palestine. The next day the Irgun exploited the demonstrations in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa, which followed the British announcement of its Jewish policy.

Marchers invaded immigration offices, destroying files and records. On May 28th the Rex Cinema in Jerusalem was blown up, and finally on June 3rd attacks were launched against post and telegraph installations, destroying mail, slashing wires, and dynamiting the main post office in Jerusalem.

Thus during a three week period, the Irgun had undertaken the most ambitious and extensive operation of which it was capable before the end of World War II. During the second day of operations the Irgun had exploited the

mass demonstrations triggered by announcement of the provisions of the White Paper. But the Irgun also showed weakness in being unable to keep the mobs in the streets. Nor could it produce a snowballing effect to swamp law enforcement agencies as was done in Singapore and Tokyo in 1955 and 1960. This failure occurred despite physical efforts comparing very well with those behind the disciplined clashes making the Singapore and Tokyo demonstrations.

The rapidity with which the British arrested the Irgun members involved in bombing the radio station -- a matter of hours after the incident -- points up the inadequacy of the insurgent effort. As the 1953 Indian Communist Party document might suggest, Irgun may have underestimated the role of the masses while grossly overestimating its own capacity to achieve political goals in isolation from the masses.

Upon the outbreak of World War II and the great influx of British and Allied troops into Palestine, Irgun agreed to a truce (September 1939). The net results of two years' effort were largely dissipated. Recognized leadership of the Jewish community remained in the hands of Haganah with its policy of Havlagah along with its belief that both national and international conditions indicated the expedition of illegal immigration to be the principal end of clandestine activity.

Within the Irgun, however, there was one group which never accepted the truce. This became known as the Stern Gang -- a group which continued a campaign of terror and sabotage all through the war. Working substantially in isolation, however, the Stern Gang's efforts produced few results by the end of the war.

THE FRENCH SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION (OAS), 1961-1963

Abstract. This is a classic example of a terrorist operation within the framework of Model One, Form 3—a covert revolt conducted by skilled and disciplined personnel (the OAS) who relied upon terror, sabotage and other forms of extralegal activity but who were unsupported by the bulk of the populace and could appeal only to an ethnic minority, the colons (the French resident population). To compensate for the low level of support elicited by political work, the attempt was made to penetrate French security forces in Algeria in order to exploit them as a source of supply. The OAS was internationally organized, with supporters in metropolitan France and in the Army elements stationed in Germany. Spain was utilized as a haven where overt activities were tolerated. The political content of the movement was both highly sectarian and beyond the OAS's competence to achieve. Its central theme was provocations to incite the FLN to a recommencement of hostility through persistent actions against the muslim population.

The activities of the OAS were provoked by the series of negotiations between French and Algerian nationalist leaders which began in 1961 and concluded with the agreement leading to Algerian independence which was signed at Evian-les-Bains on March 18, 1962. The purpose and mission of the OAS was threefold: (1) to assassinate de Gaulle or bring about his overthrow; (2) to force an indefinite postponement of Algerian independence by provoking a resumption of hostilities after the ceasefire of March 19, 1962; and, (3) secure certain minimum concessions from the FLN regarding the fate of the colons.

By indiscriminate attacks on Arab civilians, the OAS leadership evidently believed it could so exacerbate French-Algerian relations that the Algerians would be provoked into massive countermeasures, that full-scale war would be resumed, and that no settlement would be possible. By selective bombings and attacks on prominent French public figures who opposed the organization's

policies, they apparently believed they could terrorize these men into opposing the Government's policy of seeking a cease-fire and settlement. Their ultimate hope was to leave the French Government with no alternative but to prolong and finally to win the Algerian war, but the leaders of the movement were significantly silent as to how they expected this victory to be achieved or what they expected it to look like, once achieved." 85

Although the population of France was basically hostile to the goals sought by the OAS, the colons in Algeria were generally sympathetic. The French Army was initially torn between sympathy for former comrades-in-arms, on the one hand, and loyalty to Paris on the other. As a result, the OAS could rely upon a number of officers and non-commissioned officers in the Army as well as certain police in major Algerian cities.

In their operations, OAS terrorists used all of the tricks available to them, including kidnapping, assassination, extortion, bank robbery, pirate broadcasts, and publications. The record of their bombings is unusually extensive:

Bombings
(France)

314	18 Aug-30 Sept 1961
58	Second half of Nov 1961
37	1-12 Dec 1961

(Algeria)

426	Same dates as above
567	
508	

After January, 1962 and the beginning of FLN reprisals, it becomes impossible to tell the bombing incidents apart. By May 23, 5019 had been killed and 8943 wounded -- most of whom were Algerian Muslims.

But the OAS failed to launch a coordinated political-organizational effort to parallel its terrorist program. These former French military personnel "rather took the wholly negative line of obstructionism and terror. If, indeed, its leaders could have brought about major defections from the French military forces it would have established the conditions in which a true coup d'etat can take place, but the chances of this grew slimmer as time passed."⁸⁶

In a classic miscalculation of probable Army reaction, the OAS on March 23, 1962 machine-gunned to death one lieutenant and five soldiers. On March 26th the OAS used the colons as cover for an attempted breakthrough a barricade. This involved firing upon the French Army. The Army in both instances reacted with force. In the first, it laid siege to an OAS district using artillery and planes. In the second, it opened point-blank fire upon OAS and civilians alike. After these two incidents the OAS lost all hope of enlisting the support of the Army.⁸⁷

In France, the Government relied on the Police, the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, and the Deuxieme Bureau for its anti-terrorist measures. The primary aim of the Government was to refrain from major arrests until it had thoroughly analyzed the structure of the OAS. It then moved quickly against this structure and effectively dismantled the organization in France by August of 1963.

In Algeria, given the rather dubious loyalty of the police and the Army, the French Government chose to move slowly without forcing an issue with the Army while also allowing time for the OAS-colons and the FLN-Muslim Algerians to reach an understanding.

Illustrative of some of the difficulties encountered by the French authorities in coping with the OAS was the experience of counter-terrorist squads sent to track down and destroy the OAS. Dubbed the Barbouzes (False Beards), their arrival and whereabouts was supposed to be kept secret. But because of the collusion between the Algiers Police, the Army, and the OAS, many of these secret agents became repeated targets of the OAS with occasionally disastrous results.³⁸

On balance, however, the OAS campaign was not successful. It failed to provoke a military coup in Paris, to force the FLN into renewed fighting with the French Army, and, above all, it failed to assassinate or remove de Gaulle. The most that can be said of the OAS campaign is that it might have played some part in assuring some betterment of the prospects faced by the French settlers who were to remain in Algeria. Some additional guarantees for the safety of Frenchmen were obtained in the final settlement between the OAS and the FLN.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA - 1953

Abstract. This was a grossly unprepared effort to advertise and popularize a campaign of sedition against the government through a display of force. No effort was made to build a competing power basis within the population; the incident, which relied exclusively upon surprise for its impact, was initiated in isolation from the citizenry.

In the summer of 1953 the island of Cuba was ruled by a military dictatorship in effective control of the country. Opposition leaders had fled the country and the legislature had become a rubber stamp. The population was cowed by Batista's seizure of power some 15 months earlier and his systematic liquidation of the remaining democratic institutions of government -- a liquidation acquiesced in by both the courts and the legislature. Potential opposition was silenced through the suicide of the two most popular leaders, Eduardo Chibas and Manuel Supervielle,⁸⁹ and by Batista's dissolution of all political parties. Labor attempted protest strikes in March of 1952, but failed to find support. Havana University students then staged a four-day "wake" followed by burial ceremonies for the 1940 Constitution.⁹⁰ But for these occasional outbursts, general apathy prevailed. Batista met his international commitments, fostered international trade, and won the essential support of businessmen and merchants.

Insurgent forces in the case under study were limited to some 170 untrained youth equipped with small arms. Their political support was

confined to two small cells -- one in Havana and one in Artemisa in the Province of Pinar del Rio. They lacked the support of any political party or significant segment of the population. Members of the expedition financed their own operation.

The mission set for itself by this band was to arouse public opinion against the Batista government and to establish a locus of power for an opposition movement. This mission was to be accomplished by an early morning attack upon the army barracks in Santiago de Cuba -- a barracks housing a complement of 1,000 soldiers with the normal arms and equipment of a U.S. battalion.

After only a few hours the attack was rendered a complete fiasco and was suppressed with extreme brutality. Sixty-seven of the participants who surrendered were killed before trial. In retrospect, the wanton mutilation and murder of prisoners, combined with Castro's indictment of Batista during the course of his trial, have been cited as providing Batista's opponents with a popular cause justifying, by implication, the character of the ill-fated operation and the means employed to effect it. In fact, "causes" are too often created later by well-organized insurgent forces who seek past precedents to legitimize their own operations. The incident at Moncada Barracks may have become a "cause" simply because there arose more sophisticated movements with real political-organizational content. It would be interesting to speculate upon the number of potential "causes" which have died in man's history for failure of his progeny to seize upon them.

COMMENTS ON THE TERRORIST DEMONSTRATION

In contrast to the rich and varied experiences deriving from the survey of either planned or spontaneous demonstrations, the terrorist effort bears little fruit. Although these latter efforts may have been highly organized, the real genius of these operations was essentially emotional. The organizations in question seemed more concerned with the exclusion, rather than the inclusion of individuals, even if inclusion might have affected only peripheral auxiliary elements. One might use the adjective erratic in characterizing the phenomenon of terrorism.

In none of the cases cited did the political objectives sought bear a realistic relationship to the physical strength, organizational resources, or political following available to the insurgents.

The terrorist lacks the flexibility gained by the professional insurgent in his probing operations against security forces through a system of legal or extra-legal mass or front organizations. The terrorist is not free to adapt the character of his offensive to the weaknesses of his opposition as those weaknesses are disclosed by a variety of probing activities. He cannot progressively deploy additional bands of parallel organizations and thus force the government to dilute or fragment its response to a multifaceted threat. The terrorist has no organizational means of countering government measures aimed at the hard core of the conflict managers themselves. None of these capabilities was to be seen in the cases of the Irgun, the OAS, and the attack on the Moncada Barracks.

There is, however, more in common between the terrorist and the spontaneous demonstrator than between the terrorist and the type of planner exemplified by the Singapore and Tokyo incidents. In an ultimate sense, the terrorist believes in spontaneity. He initiates his operations with emotional impetuosity and righteous indignation. His plans do not reflect objective assessment of realities.

The origins of modern terrorism are found in the frustrations of the nineteenth century intelligentsia, especially that of eastern Europe. The "People's Will," the late nineteenth century Russian organization of Mihaïlov is perhaps the first classic example, although parallels can be found even earlier in Serb, Croat, Czech, and Polish history. Nor was the history of Polish anarchism without influence on the leaders of the Irgun. Jabotinsky organized his Brit Trumpeldor in Poland in 1923, while his successor Menachem Begin was also a Pole. Stern not only maintained his ties with Poland, but proposed to train his terrorists in Poland, relying upon the assistance of Polish army officers. (In contrast, Haganah's irregular units after 1937 were trained by the British Captain Wingate.) As James Eliot Cross aptly said of the French OAS: "The members of such a group do not consider themselves criminals, but the anti-social nature of their effort leaves the government little choice but to treat them as such." 91

MODEL TWO: DIRECT POWER SEIZURE VIA URBAN OPERATIONS

Broadly speaking, the Urban operations falling within the confines of this model can be subdivided into two groups: the Palace Coup and the Mass Urban Uprising. The first of these two forms is of no great concern in this paper, since by tradition the Palace Coup involves no significant socio-economic transformation of the society in which it occurs. Such a power change involves only a substitution of individuals, all of whom belong to the dominant or elite elements of the society in which they are active. Innumerable examples exist in the near East and in Latin America.

The situation obtaining in Bolivia, for example, from the period of the Chaco War with Paraguay in the early 1930's up to 1952 is characteristic of this condition. During a quarter of a century, not a single legally elected Bolivian President served out his complete term. During the last 10 years of this era there were seven presidents and eight revolutions.⁹² But the consequence of the turbulence was not a significant socio-economic reorganization of Bolivian society; rather it was simply the displacement of one urban elite group by another with little or no modification in the life of either the urban or rural citizenry. The events of 1952 and the following years, however, were substantially different for the Bolivians. They fall into the second form of model two and will be considered in detail in this portion of the survey.

This second form, the mass urban uprising, is a major concern here

whether this drive for power was completed in one day or two or led to a protracted urban operations lasting several years. It occupies a particular prominent place in the literature of the communist insurgents.

That the communist should concern himself specifically with this form of insurgency follows first of all from the character of the Petrograd revolution of November 1917 -- and second -- from the class bias of communist ideology which encourages the communist to operate through the proletariat in urban areas. An excellent example of the communists' conception of the second model can be drawn from a statement by a member of the American Communist Party, first published in the middle of the 1930's. He described the course of events (or the "incident pattern") leading to an urban seizure of power, in the following words:

A time comes when there is demoralization above, a growing revolt below; the morale of the army is also undermined. The old structure of society is tottering. There are actual insurrections; the army wavers. Panic seizes the rulers. A general uprising begins.

Workers stop work, many of them seize arms by attacking arsenals. Many had arms themselves before as the struggle sharpened. Street fights become frequent. Under the leadership of communist party, the workers organized revolutionary committees to be in command of the uprising. There are battles in the principal cities. Barricades are built and defended. The workers' fighting has a decisive influence with the soldiers. Army units begin to join the revolutionary fighters; there is fraternization between the workers and the soldiers, the workers and marines. The movement among the soldiers and the marines spreads. Capitalism is losing its strongest weapon, the army. The police as a rule continue fighting, but they are soon silenced and made to flee by the united revolutionary forces of workers and soldiers. The revolution is victorious. 93

Of decisive importance in this description of the course of events is the emphasis upon the broad popular participation in the urban uprisings. The presence of this factor is decisive as is readily brought out through comparison of Palestine after 1944 with La Paz, Bolivia, in April 1952 and Surakarta (Solo) and Madiun in the Fall of 1948.

PALESTINE, 1944 - 1946

This uprising was undertaken to effect a power seizure in the principal urban centers (Model Two, Form 2). From its inception, the campaign was conceived as a protracted insurgency but differed from the bulk of modern revolutionary wars by its preeminently urban orientation. In contrast to the earlier insurgency movement of the Jewish community (see Model One, Form 3: The Irgun, 1938-1939), this effort was characterized, after November 1945, by the blending of terrorism with broad political activity, utilizing the publically tolerated associations of the Haganah from which the Jewish population's acknowledged leadership was drawn.

The pattern of incidents consequently expanded from one of "limited variety, but persistent execution" to one of multiple dimensions and encompassing breadth. The British peacekeeping effort required substantially larger military forces than earlier, but failed to display a mastery over the course of events comparable to that of the pre-World War Two period. Significantly weak in the latter period was the political content of the British counterinsurgency program.

In January 1944, the Irgun (Zionist underground) declared war on the British in Palestine. Except for military installations, which would not be attacked until after VE Day, the Irgun proposed to return to the policies of terrorism which it had utilized extensively during the two years immediately preceding the Second World War. The consequences of Irgun activities in 1945 and 1946 would prove to be decidedly different from those of the previous years. The reason? A fundamental alteration in the political character of the newly rejoined offensive.

Initially, Haganah continued its policy of cooperation with the British. This policy was finally abandoned by Haganah following the British announcement

on 13 November 1945 of its new policy regarding the issue of Jewish immigration. The prohibition originally called for in the May 1939 "White Paper" was forgotten, but legal immigration was to be limited still to the rate of 15,000 per year. This announcement fundamentally altered the character of further operations in Palestine. After that date Haganah joined with Irgun and indeed with the Stern gang as well, in escalating insurgent operations. The period from November 1945, stretching into 1946, became the era of the "United Resistance Movement."

It is instructive to compare the characteristic incidents patterns of the period before November 1945 with those thereafter. Prior to the juncture marked by the British pronouncement, the pattern of incidents provoked by Irgun look very much like those of its 1938-1939 period. Thus, in the summer of 1944, Irgun is seen attacking the police stations at Jaffa-Tel Aviv. It attacks the central broadcasting office, Ramallah. It blows up the British Central Police Headquarters in Jerusalem. On none of these occasions are terrorist activities accompanied by propaganda, agitation or political activity. On no occasion are the mobs brought out into the street.

The incident pattern beginning in November 1945 stands in marked contrast. On 13 November 1945 a protest strike is called for the following day. On 14 November 1945 a quasi-organized procession begins to move through Tel Aviv. British offices and shops are attacked by the afternoon of 14 November. By 1815 hours British military vehicles are stoned in the streets. By 1840 hours the district administration offices are set afire and

within the hour mobs are attacking the British paratroopers stationed at Colonial Square in Tel Aviv. The income tax office and other official administrative offices of the British mandate authorities are also attacked.

The British resorted to a curfew at 2330 hours on 14 November but it was immediately broken by unmanageable crowds on 15 November: more buildings were set afire and looting became rampant. In the face of terrorism, agitation, and political activity, called for by the National Jewish Council (Vaad Leumi), the British rapidly lost their competence to maintain order and to reassert their authority. Ultimately, British colonial authorities turned the problem of Palestine over to the United Nations and prepared for an evacuation.

The foregoing case dealt with a highly sophisticated, extremely well organized insurgency in an urban area.⁹⁴ With the intervention of the Arabs, it would also assume a protracted character.

LA PAZ, BOLIVIA, 1952

Abstract. National power was seized through a coup d'etat in the capital city, supported by broad elements of the urban population. Distinct signs of organizational and political work within the mass of the participating populace were apparent during the period prior to the uprising. To this extent, the incident pattern stands in contrast to that at Bogota in April 1948 (see Model One, Form 2 : the Bogotazo). However, the premeditated planning and channels for coordination were not the equal of those in the post-1944 period in Palestine, discussed in the preceding entry. Spontaneity played a distinctly larger role here in line with the temperament and mentality of the Latin revolutionary.

At La Paz, Bolivia, on 9 April 1952, the urban uprising, though long in its psychological building, was short in duration and lacked the type of highly sophisticated organization evident in Palestine in 1945. In common with Palestine, however, this successful uprising was based upon broad popular participation. The leadership of the Bolivian uprising lay with Gen Antonio Seleme, Chief of the Carabineros (the National Military Police) and with the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR).

Through the police, the revolutionaries were supplied with leadership, and with all-important arms, and at the critical juncture of the second day of revolutionary activities, they enjoyed the assistance of the cadet volunteers of the Police Academy, who dismantled the batteries mounted on the rim of the plateau above La Paz.

The MNR enjoyed the close cooperation of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR) and of the very recently established Partido Comunista de Bolivia. But more important than either of these political ties was the MNR's tie with the Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros, the miners union. Its executive secretary, Juan Lechin, was at the same time a member in good standing in the MNR and was also associated with the POR.

For a time it seemed as if the military junta controlling Bolivia would win. Victory to the police-MNR combination was assured on 10 April, however, when armed miners began to arrive from the camps near Oruro. General Antonio Seleme then withdrew and Victor Paz Estenssoro, who had actually been elected President in 1951, was finally able to assume office in 1952.

Political motivation and appropriate material for rallying the masses was provided by the persistent policies of the several governments of the preceeding years, which had suppressed free political action in Bolivia and assumed a position of hostility towards labor and towards the Indian population of Bolivia. A strike of the miners' union had been brutally suppressed in 1949. A general strike in 1950 was crushed. Broad elements of the population looked to the MNR for leadership, well conscious of the latter organization's attempt in August 1949 to begin a rural insurgency. (Indeed, for a time, revolutionary MNR elements had held the Department of Santa Cruz and part of the Department Cochabamba.⁹⁵) "In April 1952, it was plain that if Bolivia did not have an MNR government it would have no government at all. The Party had planned a revolution for later in the year, but the defection of one of the military junta to their ranks made revolution an immediate necessity."⁹⁶

Despite this brevity, the course of incidents during the Revolution indicated progressive increase in the size of the forces and the number of elements involved in the uprising; thus, as events escalated, even Indian market women in La Paz played an important role, "going up to the simple Indian soldiers who made up the regiment garrisons of the capital, and seizing their guns from their hands."⁹⁷

SURAKARTA AND MADIUN, INDONESIA, SEPTEMBER 1948

Abstract. An attempt was made to acquire a preeminent hold on national power through the seizure and retention of critical urban centers (Model Two, Form 2). The operation was directed by a highly trained Communist Party cadre with extensive experience in political/organizational work. A dual power basis had in fact been erected through the integration of a system of mass organizations, but the extent of effective control over broad strata of the population was grossly overestimated by the party leadership. It likewise misjudged the impact of its announced public policies and political slogans on the citizenry at large. Much closer to the political realities of the day, the national government responded with proclamations calculated to rally support and then resorted to immediate military action. The uprising developed into rural guerrilla action for which the Communist Party was equally unprepared and it had ceased to pose a threat before the end of the year. (For urban operations which escalate into Phase Two rural insurgency, see Model Three: Singapore, Malaya and Hanoi.)

With the lessons to be drawn from Bolivia and Palestine in mind, attention can be turned to another effort that falls within this model but which was unsuccessful: Indonesia. Indonesia provides an excellent example of an unsuccessful effort at power seizure by a dissident, tightly organized Communist minority which understood the procedures employed in creating dual power structures but failed utterly to utilize them effectively.

Following the Renville agreement of 17 January 1948 a cease fire existed between the Dutch and the Republican forces on the island of Java. The Van Mook line drawn across the Island of Java left some one-third of the territory of the island, in the hands of the Republican Forces with a population of approximately 30 million people.

According to the Renville Agreement, a plebiscite was to be conducted throughout the island under U.N. auspices. The Dutch were not to stand in the way of the completion of this effort. In fact, however, in September the Dutch were still successfully hampering any effort in that direction. In addition, they were tightening their blockade around Republican Java, creating a desperate economic situation. The influx of some 35,000 Republican troops plus tens of thousands of civilians, largely government officials and their families, taxed even further the economic and nutritional capabilities, and medical facilities of Republican Indonesia.

The government of the Republic was located at Jogjakarta. After 29 January 1948 a coalition cabinet was headed by Mohammed Hatta. His cabinet included members of the P.N.I. (Nationalists), the Islamic groups (Masjumi and P.S.I.I. or United Indonesian Islamic Party), plus Catholics and Protestants. After the middle of February 1948 this cabinet also enjoyed the support of the right-wing of the Socialist Party, under Sjahrir, which called itself the P.S.I., and pursued an essentially anti-Communist stand. This did not prevent an independent and quite unorthodox Communist Party, formed in the summer of 1948, from also supporting the government of Mohammed Hatta. This last party, the G.R.R., or Revolutionary People's Movement, was organized by the associates of Tan Malaka. The latter had led revolutionary activities in the immediate post-World War II period, but he now assumed a stance of unequivocal hostility toward the Moscow-oriented orthodox Communist Party.

It is apparent then that an extremely broad, highly representative government existed in that portion of Indonesia under Republican control in the midst of 1948. Unrepresented in the government was a complex of

left-wing elements, principal among them the Communist Party of Indonesia (P.K.I.), headed after 1 September 1948 by the notorious and mysterious Musso, the leader of the abortive 1926 revolt. Musso had returned to Indonesia in the beginning of August after twelve years exile in Moscow.

The P.K.I. enjoyed the support of the left-wing of the Socialist Party, led by Amir Sjarifuddin (Premier and Defense Minister in Republican Indonesia during the period 3 July 1947 to 23 January 1948). Amir's following has been characterized as "urban and estate workers, small traders, minor officials, and the armed adolescent gangs of the day."⁹⁸ The P.K.I. also enjoyed the support of the Labor Party (Partai Buruh) of Setiadjit, and SOBSI (all-Indonesian Central Organization of Labor), which controlled a system of 32 affiliated unions, claiming a membership of more than 1.25 million persons.⁹⁹

This P.K.I.-dominated Left also included an Indonesian peasant front and, finally, the Pesindo, the Party's unofficial paramilitary organization. Here was an obvious conglomeration of organizations which fully represented the Communist strategy of establishing mass transmission belts through which to evoke support from the general populace. In addition, the Indonesian Communists had also successfully penetrated elements of the formal armed forces of the country, with a particularly significant concentration of influence in Surakarta.

The Communist strategy for acquiring power was outlined in a blueprint entitled "Stepping to the New Stage of Military Struggle." It was clearly an attempt to organize a power seizure with priority attention to urban centers to be followed by the building of a rural guerrilla force through which the capital, at that time Jogjakarta, would finally

be seized. The base areas for priority attention were the towns of Surakarta and Madiun. The Indonesian Communists proposed to create an independent de facto government from which they would direct an armed struggle against the Republican government. To prepare for their so-called non-parliamentary phase of struggle they proposed to do the following:

- 1) Withdraw those elements of the Indonesian army under Communist influence from the front line facing the Dutch.

- 2) Redeploy those troops in "areas we consider as being strategic". Madiun was to be made "the strongest guerrilla stronghold for the long-term struggle," with 5 battalions of troops, and Surakarta was to be turned into a Communist "wild west" as a diversionary effort.¹⁰⁰

Activities began with disorders in the region of Surakarta and Madiun, provoked by the Pesindo during the period March and April 1948. On 7 September, Musso conferred with the leaders of the 4th Division quartered at Surakarta and commanded by communist colonels. The following days saw the general distribution of handbills offered by S.O.B.S.I. not only in Surakarta and Madiun, but likewise in Jogjakarta. In sharp language they denounced the Hatta cabinet for "treachery."

On 11 September, the command of the 4th Division sent an ultimatum to the other military units in the city of Surakarta loyal to the Republican government. When the response fell short of the communists' desire, namely total control of Surakarta, the 4th Division, backed up by the Pesindo irregulars, commenced a frontal attack upon the other military units. On the same day, 13 September 1948, two additional battalions of communist militia occupied the villages on the outskirts of Madiun. The Red flag was raised.

The Indonesian president, Sukarno, responded with firmness and optimism. He proclaimed martial law for the greater portion of east Java, and rushed reinforcements to Surakarta to support loyal forces. On 16 September Mohammed Hatta, in an unprecedented statement, formally denounced the P.K.I. in a speech before the Indonesian Parliament. By 17 September the Communist offensive at Surakarta had been broken. The "wild west" show as a diversionary effort had ended. Colonel Subruto was appointed military governor of the revolted area in eastern Java.

The government's move threw the Communists into consternation. They had not anticipated so sharp a response, nor, did they expect the general support given the government by the civil population. At the same time the Communists were not properly prepared to proceed immediately into a defense of their stronghold now developed at Madiun. Musso concluded that he needed "some months more for agitation and public speech-making before he could dare to claim enough popular support to try to throw out Sukarno and Hatta. Furthermore, Sjarifuddin, Musso, Suripno, Setiadjit, and the other Communist leaders, were widely scattered over Republican Java, and could not confer as to what to do about this urgent threat to their main stronghold."¹⁰¹

In haste, the Communists did decide to fight an all-out battle for Madiun. Madiun was turned into a Soviet-style independent city-state. An armed force in excess of 3,000 was concentrated in and about the city. The government responded immediately with an east-west pincers against the town of Madiun.

By the night of 28/29 September, Musso and his troops were forced to evacuate the city. They were left with no recourse but to commence a rural guerrilla effort which was smashed, in turn, by the end of the year. It was altogether apparent that the Communist effort had been premature, that the escalation had proceeded at far too great a speed, and that the initiative had fallen to the government. The insurgents were given no opportunity to exploit the potentials inherent in their system of mass organization. Further, these mass organizations did not dominate broad elements of the population as the P.A.I. claimed.

MODEL THREE: PRECIPITATION OF NATIONWIDE INSURGENCY

In the precipitation of a nationwide insurgency urban insurgency may be used as the springboard for the commencement of protracted revolutionary warfare in rural areas. The insurgent's frame of reference and the goals he seeks in urban areas take on a new perspective once the dissident apparatus has determined that guerrilla bands will be formed in the countryside. The insurgents' ability to carry the day in a mass demonstration calculated to absorb several weeks or several months of time, at the outside, is not longer as important as it was previously. He need not necessarily show mastery of the urban situation at this juncture. Again he need not at this juncture totally commit the forces available to him in the urban area. Now he no longer occupies the center of the stage, but must view his activities and plan his tactical operations with the understanding that they are a subordinate element of a plan of operation which now surpasses his distinctive problems.

Once the minimum goals set for any single specific operation have been achieved, he may now back down. In any case, the level of intensity of the activities he undertakes may fall far short of that which was witnessed at Tokyo in 1960. His task may be quite simply to provide the movement with martyrs to enhance the creditability of the insurgent's rationalization for launching rural activities. An example of this took place in December of 1954 when crowds were provoked to parade in the streets of Limassol, Cyprus shouting the slogan Enosis. The incident was deemed a success when three youths were wounded, thereby making it possible for the insurgents to immediately hail them as heroes and martyrs in both Greece and Cyprus. ¹⁰²

Given this orientation of activities, it follows that the requirements for effective counterinsurgent activity likewise vary. The experience of the British in Malaya and Singapore in 1947 and 1948 are indicative of this altered situation.

SINGAPORE AND MALAYA, 1947 - 1948

Abstract. These uprisings form an example of the urban operation implemented to precipitate an early, if not concurrent, outbreak of insurgency in rural areas (Model Three). Seeing in the membership of mass organizations a prime source from which to recruit the forces necessary for a future guerrilla war, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) concentrated its efforts through the year 1947 on the control of labor organizations in Singapore and Malaya proper. Operations concentrated on the Chinese ethnic groups. Confronted with the government's efforts to regulate trade unionism in 1945 and encouraged by Moscow to step up operations after February of that year, the MCP's urban operations of the late winter and the spring of 1948 consisted of tapping this critical manpower source to create a force numbering in the thousands which was clandestinely withdrawn from urban centers for training and organization in the interior. The counterinsurgency response in Singapore contrasts with that in the peninsula. The administration of the island assigned great attention to the immediate apprehension of subversives, while the officials of the peninsula made an effort to legislate the MCP out of the labor unions through the drafting of stricter qualifications for office. While both such policies can contribute greatly to internal security, the decision as to where reliance should be placed—as the experience of 1948 suggests—is significantly influenced by the strategy pursued at any given time by the insurgents.

By 1947 the Malayan Communist Party could boast of the comprehensiveness of its organization complete in every detail, from a general secretariat at the top, to a system of local branches and cells both in Malaya proper and in

the city of Singapore. It had retained control over the veterans of the anti-Japanese guerrilla era, through the formation of the MPAJA Ex-Services Comrade Association which maintained branches in every town and "fair-size village in the country."¹⁰³ In addition, the party provided direction for a system of labor, youth, women and other comparable mass organizations which had "mushroomed in the country,"¹⁰⁴ and dominated two trade union organizations: the "Singapore Federation of Trade Unions" (SFTU), and the "Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions" (PMFTU).

These labor associations and trade union organizations had in themselves come to constitute nearly a state within the state--a dual power hierarchy in the most perfect sense. By January 1947, the Communist party "considered that it had achieved control over labour."¹⁰⁵ And in the course of that year the party organization was involved in the most serious outbreaks of unrest in both Malaya and Singapore. Three hundred major strikes and industrial disputes in a 12 month period resulted in the loss of slightly under 700,000 working days.

In February of 1948, the Malayan Communist Party, as well as the Indonesian Communist Party, the Burmese Communist Party, and other radical elements in Southeast Asia and the Far East received orders to commence insurrections in the immediate future. For the Malayan Communist Party, this not only meant the remobilization of veterans from the preceding period of guerrilla warfare against the Japanese, but also the recruiting of guerrillas from the ranks of labor, youth, and other social organizations.

In view of the coming emergency, -- it was officially declared as of 17 June 1948 in Malaya proper, but in fact had started at least a month earlier -- the policies adopted by British authorities in Singapore, were much more realistic than those pursued in Malaya proper. In January of 1948, Communist control over labor in the harbor area of Singapore was broken by a ruling of the Harbor Board. Concurrently the city government arrested a number of Communist Union leaders, raided their organization's central headquarters, and dissolved the MCP-controlled "Workers Protection Corps", a strong arm organization created to intimidate recalcitrant laborers.

Shortly thereafter the government preparation of additional legislation of still tighter control of the trade unions drove the party leaders remaining in Singapore underground and left the SFTU and the MCP so weakened organizationally that the communist uprising in the federation was not duplicated in the island colony. 106

The passage of restrictive legislation, followed by the immediate apprehension of known subversives, was the key to the counterinsurgent effort in Singapore.

In May 1948, just as the emergency was about to begin, new laws were also enacted in Kuala Lumpur in an attempt to accomplish the following:

- (1) prohibit anyone from holding office in a trade union, except as secretary, unless he had three years of experience in the industry or trade concern;
- (2) prohibit persons convicted of extortion, intimidation and like crimes from holding office; and
- (3) prohibit any federation of trade unions except on an industry or occupational basis. 107

Provisions of such a character as these are excellent counterinsurgent procedures when combatting an insurgent organization's drive to mobilize the masses in the streets for the conduct of demonstrations. However, the adoption of such policies at a time when the insurgent's preparations for a guerrilla war had been completed, could have little effect upon the urban activities of the Malayan communist party. During the month of May 1948 and in the preceding two months, the MCP had been actively engaged in quietly withdrawing its future guerrilla personnel from urban areas. The government's ability to dominate labor unions was no longer a prime issue. These legalistic counterinsurgency measures to have been meaningful should have been placed on the statute books no later than the end of the preceding year.

HANOI, VIETNAM, DECEMBER 1946

Abstract. This demonstrates an attempt to achieve maximum initial advantage at the commencement of rural insurgency through a concurrent, all-out urban uprising (Model Three). There were two distinctive features surrounding the Viet Minh operation: (1) the prior existence of a major guerrilla force of some 50,000, tactically deployed not only in the vicinity of Hanoi, but at critical locations elsewhere in Vietnam; (2) the de facto existence of a fully organized parallel government structure in the country which actually controlled significant rural areas, not only militarily, but also economically and administratively. The issue of liberation from a colonial regime was exploited, but no sharp line could be drawn to divide the resident population along racial lines, as was the case in the aftermath of the 1945 incident at Setif (see Model One, Form 2). Counterinsurgent forces were unprepared for the uprising and were forced into the defensive in many rural areas as well as in the Hanoi-Haiphong sector.

Another set of goals, characteristic of insurgent urban operations at the outset of a protracted revolutionary war, can be readily identified through a brief examination of Viet Minh activities in Hanoi and other urban areas of Vietnam in 1946. On 6 March 1946, the reappearance of French naval elements in the port of Haiphong, for the first time since the end of World War II, coincided with the conclusion of an accord between Ho Chi Minh and the French Diplomat Jean Sainteny in Hanoi. The agreement recognized the Republic of Vietnam as a free and independent state within the French Union with its own government, parliament, army and treasury. Yet, at that very moment, the military forces of Vietnam were increasing in size, not decreasing. By November 1946 that military force would number about 50,000.¹⁰⁸

In all likelihood plans had already been completed for the uprising in Hanoi which would occur on 19 December 1946, for the character of the

incident pattern indicated that the operations undertaken were "meticulously planned and well executed."¹⁰⁹ The extent of Viet Minh preparation became apparent on 20 November 1946, when upon hearing shots from the harbor area, elements of the Viet Minh moved immediately to the central market in Hanoi and killed or wounded a group of unarmed French soldiers engaged in the purchase of vegetables for their units. Twenty-three French soldiers were killed that day without any French counter-action. Two days later French soldiers engaged in the retrieval of the bodies of those murdered by the Japanese in March 1945 at Lang-son garrison were again attacked by a Viet Minh unit and lost 6 more dead. Thereupon an ultimatum was sent to the Viet Minh ordering the immediate evacuation of the Chinese quarter of the city. It was not the Viet Minh organization which withdrew, however, but unarmed Vietnamese civilians who left by thousands. The French, not realizing that the large group of persons moving in the direction of the French airbase of Cat-Bi were civilians, opened fire, supported by the fire from a French heavy cruiser anchored in the harbor. In the ensuing panic some 6,000 civilians were mutilated or trampled to death.

By November 22 the fighting had subsided and the Viet Minh withdrew its regulars from Hanoi. These were replaced by elements of the guerrilla auxiliary, the Tu-Vũ (militia), who took up positions on the Hanoi-Haiphong road. Thereafter the Viet Minh Commander, Vo Nguyen Giap, ordered the erection of barricades in Hanoi, and asked the population "to pierce house walls so as to permit direct communications from block to block without having to cross streets."¹¹⁰

December 19, 1946, was the date chosen by the Viet Minh to launch their urban uprising in Hanoi--the first blow in what came to be known as the "Indo-China War." Before the day was over a preconceived plan had been implemented and the French army suffered a serious blow. In the morning, Ho Chi Minh wrote a friendly letter to the French administrator, while Giap "suggested to his counterpart, Morliere, that a cancellation of the order restricting French troops to their quarters would also have a relaxing effect on the atmosphere."¹¹¹ The French took the Viet Minh leaders at their word, and indeed returned to the practice of issuing leave passes. At 1800 hours, an intelligence agent reported to French headquarters that the revolt was indeed planned for that evening. It was too late now to recall the soldiers to quarters. At 2000 hours, the electric power plant at Hanoi was destroyed and the city fell into utter darkness. Thereafter, the Tu-Ve began a systematic attack on all French urban installations. Moreover the principal routes employed by the French were mined in the general urban area. Additionally, some 500 French civilians, including women and children were kidnapped.

Urban Dynamics at the Commencement of Guerrilla Warfare

Once the decision to launch a rural protracted guerrilla warfare has been made, the insurgent has a variety of courses of action open to him. He may undertake operations to demonstrate his strength, thus giving the recruit in his guerrilla force the feeling that he is "betting on the right side." He may choose to produce martyrs in an attempt to cloak his claims in an aura of righteousness, thus justifying his demands for retribution. Again, he may be primarily concerned with attracting world attention to his

uprising at the very onset, and he may make a supreme effort to win favorable external press coverage of his insurgent movement. On yet another plane, his intent may be the acquisition of supplies, money or hostages. Any of these courses of action can significantly assist concurrent rural efforts at its point of departure. He may, as at Hanoi in 1946, be greatly concerned with the destruction of critical counterinsurgency installations, or he may use the urban uprising as a means of acquiring more recruits by compromising them through their role in the uprising.

The intricate patterns that follow from these alternatives may be distinctly similar with the patterns which evolved from the second model: the attempt at an immediate seizure of power in an urban area. As at La Paz, Bolivia, or at Surakarta in Indonesia, a premium was placed upon surprise. This was the strikingly dramatic factor in the coordinated bomb attack conducted by the EOKA at Nicosia, Larnaca, Famagusta, and Limassol the night of 31 March - 1 April in 1955. Within an hour, damage was done to radio stations, the Colonial Secretary's offices, police headquarters, court houses and other such counterinsurgent facilities.¹¹² Surprise, however, is not necessarily indispensable at this juncture. Secrecy may be more important, as demonstrated by the Malayan incident pattern during the earlier months of 1948. But irrespective of the blend of incidents at this critical point, the greatest vulnerability of the effort will rest with its absolute dependence upon close and continuous direction and supervision by central leadership cadres of the insurgent organization. In their absence coordination is impossible and the initiative is lost. Viewed in this light, the counterinsurgent's effort must be directed towards

immediate apprehension of individuals as is the case when faced with a
Model Two type of situation.

MODEL FOUR: SUPPORT OF RURAL OPERATIONS

In a situation where major forces are engaged in unconventional warfare in rural areas, the ability of the insurgent organization to maintain significant dissident activities in urban centers constitutes one of the most decisive weapons in splitting the counterinsurgent forces. Urban subversion can additionally destroy the psychological content of their response and assume the form of an economic war of attrition. Strikes, whether they be seemingly insignificant or built up into major operations paralyzing much of the cities' industry, constitute one of the most important economic weapons available to a well organized insurgent movement. On the other hand, the established authorities of the country in question, having mobilized in an attempt to respond to the rural threat, need not face the prospect of a possible seizure of power in urban areas until late in Phase Three. But this does not mean that extensive urban activities are any less profitable to the insurgent. Consequently "if the main emphasis and major opportunity for a rebellion lies in operations in the woods and forests, city-bred trouble will prevent the authorities from concentrating their full power against the country guerrillas."¹¹³

Perhaps one of the most effective statements on the relationship between urban and rural operations is provided in a document that appeared at the Madurai Congress of the Indian Communist Party in December 1963. This document explains the relationship between the rural partisan and the urban striker in the following manner:

Partisan warfare must be one of the major weapons in our armoury as in the case of all colonial countries. But this weapon alone cannot insure victory. It has to be combined with the other major weapons, that of strikes of the workingclass, general strikes and uprising in the cities led by armed detachments of the working class. Therefore, in order to win victory of the popular democratic revolution, it is absolutely essential to combine two basic factors--the partisan war of the peasants and the workers uprising in the cities.

Partisan areas will inevitably arise in various parts of the country as the crisis deepens and as the mass peasant movement rises to the level of revolutionary seizure of land and food grains, paralyzing and wiping out of local forces of the enemy. These areas and the revolutionary forces operating in them, however, continually face the danger of encirclement and annihilation at the hand of the enemy. Even coming into existence of liberated territory with their own armed forces in several parts of the country will not eliminate this danger because these areas will themselves be surrounded by hostile forces from all sides. Therefore, partisan war alone, no matter how widely extended, cannot insure victory over the enemy in concrete situation prevailing in India. When the maturing crisis gives rise to the partisan struggles on a wide scale, when the partisan forces in several areas are battering against the enemy, the workers in the cities vital industries and especially the transportation system will have to play a decisive role. The onslaught of the enemy against the partisan forces, against liberated areas will have to be hampered and paralyzed by mass strike actions. With hundreds of streams of partisan struggles merging with the general strikes and uprising of the workers in the cities, the enemy will find it impossible to concentrate his forces anywhere and defeat the revolutionary forces but will himself face defeat and annihilation. Even inside the armed forces of the government the crisis will grow and big sections will join the forces of revolution. 114

The examples in which insurgent forces have attempted this balance are innumerable in the history of insurgency. The effectiveness with which this has been done varies widely. The urban insurgency phase of Fidel Castro's struggle for power in Cuba can be cited as one of the less successful examples.

CUBA, 1956-1958

Abstract. Urban operations were calculated to oblige the counter-insurgent to draw elements of his operational forces back from the countryside where guerrillas were active into the urban areas, with a corresponding weakening of his rural capabilities (Model Four). Lack of operational control, deficient communication channels and inadequate training in subversive techniques rendered attempted urban "support operations" of little tactical value.

Well aware not only of the importance of creating diversions, but also of giving due attention to urban areas, Castro arranged for an uprising in Santiago de Cuba to occur simultaneously with his beachhead landing in November 1956. The target chosen characteristically was the Moncada army garrison in the city. As with so many aspects of Castro's 26 of July movement it proved to be an immature effort. The attacking force was not only annihilated, but the troops were alerted as a consequence of Castro's planned beachhead landing site. Since he did not actually land until two days after the attack took place, the troops were well in place to meet him, and in the ensuing engagement Castro lost 70 of 82 men that comprised his landing force. ¹¹⁵

Although sporadic uprisings occurred in urban areas through 1958, they remained, by and large, ineffective for the following reasons. First of all, Castro had no effective control over the urban groups conducting dissident acts. Many of the groups so engaged were not even members of his own movement, but were rather associated with other dissident political elements. Again in the case of Castro, as with the other dissident political groups in Cuba, both clandestine and terroristic activities were conducted initially by members of the middle class

intelligensia. None of the groups involved had secured in any way the support or active participation of urban labor elements, and consequently, no claim can substantiate the existence, in the period 1956 to 1958, of a dual power structure, overt or covert, in urban areas.¹¹⁶

On 13 March 1957, an attack was carried out against the Presidential Palace in Havana. The effort failed. Poor reconnaissance and lack of coordination led the attacking group of some 25 persons into a dead-end street where they were annihilated by guards.¹¹⁷ A four man team, made up of persons that did belong to the 26th of July movement, were more successful in May 1957 in their efforts to sabotage the Gas and Electric Central in Havana.¹¹⁸ Efforts were equally made to display 26th of July slogans on the walls of buildings, and to provoke parades, such as the one on 31 July 1957, in which the mothers of the dead from police reprisals marched in Santiago de Cuba.¹¹⁹

Other incidents involving kidnapping and the ambush of army patrols also took place. Che Guevara, writing later in his "Guerrilla Warfare", commended insurgents to direct considerable attention to the problem of coordinating urban activity with rural insurgency. His advice was that more attention should be given to this aspect "from the first moment of the war." This he believed would assure "much more rapid action...and with it a saving of lives and of the priceless time of the nation."¹²⁰

THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT, 1954-1962

Of a considerably more professional character are the operations of the FLN Underground in the city of Algiers during the period of 1954 to 1962. There, strikes and demonstrations, assassinations, terrorism, and indiscriminate bombings played a major role in forcing the army to concentrate major forces not in the rural areas but precisely in the major cities on the coast. Unlike the situation in Cuba, the FLN underground was tightly controlled from the top, and division of responsibility between three functional parallel channels was highly effective. A military branch protected the members of FLN engaged in the manufacture and placement of bombs. A political-administrative branch carried out assassinations and intimidations, and was intrusted with the distribution of pamphlets and tracts and the control of clandestine transportation. It likewise secured financial contributions. Finally, a liaison-intelligence branch stood between these two organizations. It relayed intelligence to the guerrillas and relayed the directives of the FLN to the underground.¹²¹

NAIROBI, 1951-1954

There is yet another major function which an insurgent organization can perform in an urban area during Phases Two and Three of an insurgency. Operations in multiple rural areas can be directed from an urban area, while supplies and communications between the rural elements are equally assured and maintained. Indeed a major urban center, perhaps the capital of the country, may very well house the executive committee, in command headquarters, of an entire insurgent movement. The city Nairobi, Kenya,

played such a role from October 1951 to April 1954 when it housed the Central Committee of the Mau Mau. So effective did the Mau Mau control of the city of Nairobi become, that it covertly maintained its own system of courts in which natives who failed to obey orders could be tried for their offenses. Operation Anvil finally restored British control over that urban area. 122

CHE GUEVARA ON SUBURBAN GUERRILLAS

To these aspects of urban insurgency--labor strikes, sabotage, and logistics--in which the masses participate, another type of operations--must be added: The destruction of factories and critical installations and the elimination of government administrative personnel by combat-experienced guerrilla bands secretly injected into an urban area. It is with this type of urban activity that Che Guevara concerns himself in his brief reference to "Suburban Warfare" in his volume Guerrilla Warfare. These guerrilla bands are not to seek the protective cover of the mass organization or labor group, but are to remain undetected by "remaining totally hidden during the day-time." They are to concentrate their attention upon unspectacular operations: cutting down telephone poles, cutting electrical wire, and destroying sewers, railways, and water mains. In contrast to the Agit/Prop Section of the Viet Cong, operating very much at home inside a Buddhist association in Saigon, Che Guevara's guerrillas, "must be considered as situated in extremely unfavorable ground, where the vigilance of the enemy will be much greater and the possibilities of reprisals as well as betrayal are increased enormously."

Above all other positive characteristics, their greatest attribute is obedience. "A suburban band will not be able to choose among the operations of destroying telephone lines, moving to make attacks in another locality, and surprising a patrol of soldiers on a distant road; it will do exactly what it is told." These are nocturnal guerrillas par excellence. The manner of their operations will only begin to change, in Che Guevara's opinion, when the insurgency moves towards the culmination of Phase Three: Mobile Warfare. At that junction their mission will then be to "take part as an active combatant in the siege of the city."¹²³

ATHENS, GREECE, DECEMBER 1944

Abstract. Here the urban operation was conceived as a means of completing the conquest of power, already substantially achieved in the countryside through the instrumentality of protracted rural warfare (Model Four). Unlike the Madiun uprising of 1948 in Indonesia (see Model Two, Form 2), which relied upon the political resilience of a system of mass organizations to produce the national support necessary to confirm an urban power seizure, the Greek Communist Party's (KKE) effort in the capital was undertaken in the context of nationwide military preponderance. Its eventual success would have been evaluated as the confirmation of a fait accompli and not as an escalation to a new phase of insurgency. Urban forces previously organized and rural guerrillas introduced secretly into the city were to serve as the initiating force. Politically, justification was sought in a criticism of the form of government supported by the British at the close of World War Two. While indigenous security elements figured in the response, British forces played the critical operational role. The concurrent political solution, fashioned under British influence, satisfactorily negated the political strategy and propaganda of the KKE.

An operation of a "support" nature did occur in December 1944, in Athens, Greece. A body of some 2,000 guerrillas drawn from the ELAS, commanded by the Greek Communist Party (KKE), and supported by some 10 to 15 thousand "ELAS Reserves," unseasoned laborers and other residents of the city of Athens attempted to destroy the British contingent in the city, occupy the principal administrative buildings, and proclaim to the world the de facto existence of a communist dominated government."¹²⁴ In this operation all of the paraphernalia of a sophisticated Communist dominated insurgency were apparent. The "ELAS Reserves" were drawn into the conflict out of the KKE's urban mass organizations. Leadership was

provided by the KKE itself. The some 2,000 trained guerrillas were utilized strictly for military operational purposes. Near the city of Athens, ELAS had additional guerrillas encamped, but the bulk of the main ELAS forces were deployed in Thessaly at the beginning of December, some 11 days march away from the Capital city.¹²⁵

The KKE had already actual control of the Greek countryside. The operation in Athens was intended to complete their control by the seizure of power in that city. It is, however, important to stress the point that this operation is altogether unlike the type of operation discussed earlier in Model Two, for there was no universal subordination of all dissident activities to this single thrust. Rather, this was a support operation which did not engage the military potential of the bulk of the guerrilla organization in the country. That the major portion of the ELAS forces was at some distance from Athens, supports this contention. These latter units were not simply recuperating after several years of persistent guerrilla warfare, but were concurrently operational, and had very specific missions to perform. They had been directed to effect the disbanding and elimination of all rival guerrilla forces in Macedonia, Epirus and other regions. They were diligently engaged in keeping British garrisons in northern rural areas pinned down; and they had set up a coastal protection system against possible British landings elsewhere.¹²⁶

As against the Communist forces, there existed in Athens at this time an English backed "government of national unity," headed by Papandhreu. The anti-Communist forces in Greece were under the command of Lieutenant General Scobie. His command included the Athens police and some 10,000 British soldiers, of whom 6,000 were combat troops divided into three

brigades. Scobie, additionally, controlled some 24 tanks, some 259 armored cars, and a squadron of Spitfires. In the course of the month of December an additional force was formed, "The Greek National Guard" of some 19,000 members divided into 36 "Athens Battallions."¹²⁷

The Communist uprising in Athens began on Sunday 3 December 1944, with street demonstrations which gradually accelerated into street fighting. Police stations were captured, and substantial numbers of policemen were executed. Attacks were carried out against government buildings, some of which were seized, and against right wing organizations. By December 6 an all-out urban war was under way in the city of Athens. The British could not acquire the initiative until the middle of the month. On the 12th of December, the British contingents in Athens were confined to an area approximately 2 miles long and 5 to 6 blocks wide.¹²⁸

The British relied on aircraft in their operations. Not only did they perform strafing operations in Athens, occasionally hurting the English cause as a result of civilian losses, but aircraft were also used to patrol the roads leading to Athens to alert the British Command of any guerrilla movement south from Thessaly. Between the 13th and 27th of December, General Alexander, Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Theater, sent two divisions of reinforcements. At the end of the month British forces in the Athens area reached a total of some 60,000 men.

The tide turned in favor of the British after the actions of 15-16 December when the ELAS forces failed to overrun the British perimeter. Nevertheless, at least another week of fighting was required to force ELAS out of the city. Meanwhile, however, the LKE had established its

control over the greater portion of the city, creating a system of "Peoples Courts" to legalize its brutal purging of the city's population. A hostage system was established, and when the ELAS finally retreated, some 15,000 civilians were forcibly marched along with them, of whom 4,000 died.¹²⁹

By the 6th of January ELAS had left the city of Athens, and five days later, it sued for an armistice. Hostilities were officially ended on the 15th of January 1945. The failure of this urban operation, however, did not destroy the insurgent organization. The major stretches of the countryside remained under the effective control of the insurgent organization. Only the following month did the KKE decide to disband portions of its guerrilla force and go underground with its remaining elements.¹³⁰

COMMENTS ON PHASE TWO AND THREE URBAN INSURGENCIES

It can be seen then that a nearly limitless choice of alternatives are available to insurgent forces in urban areas during the course of a revolutionary movement whose center of gravity lies in rural areas. Urban activities may be employed to force the dispersion of government forces, diluting their military efforts. Economic sabotage, either in the form of industrial strikes or sabotage, may significantly cripple the counter-insurgent effort. The communication system may be exploited to coordinate the operations of bands in the countryside. The supply of those bands may be likewise supervised and occur openly under the eyes of the government — the capital city itself. Finally, urban elements may significantly shorten the last phase of the conflict by attempting a seizure of power in the urban area.

If the incident pattern in Model Three shows distinct similarities with that in Model Two, then the tendency in Model Four, is to show similarity with Model One, Form 3, save in cases such as Athens 1944. The reason for this lies in the fact that the operations conducted in the last case are conceived in the framework of persistent attrition. No single action is necessarily climatic in itself, and even distinct failures may be experienced without fundamental breakdowns. But to be effective, urban operations must be persistent, and unrelenting, irrespective of the course of action chosen. In Algeria the FLN underground successfully conducted some four strikes and demonstrations in the cities of Algiers during the period 1955 to 1960, suggesting the pattern of Model One, Form 1. While this is ideal from the insurgents' viewpoint, it is hardly the characteristic norm of the urban operation at this juncture. The emphasis will be placed upon covert means; terror -- rather than political struggle -- will be dominant.

With the exception of the uprising at Athens in December 1944, the techniques employed by counterinsurgent forces within the urban area in a Model Four situation, likewise display similarities with those obtaining under the conditions of Model One, Form 3. The outstanding distinctions are:

- (1) The relatively fewer troops and other security elements available for full-time local use;
- (2) The political/ideological awareness within the general urban population induced by the agit/prop effort of the rural insurgents, but now redounding to the benefit of the urban apparatus.

The stresses, inherent in this urban situation for any serious counter-insurgent effort, were not experienced by the Batista regime in 1956 or early 1957 due to the inadequacy of Castro's urban organization. But, both the British in Kenya and the French in Algeria were obliged to reorient their policies once this situation developed.

The most comprehensive response propounded to resolve this challenge has come from the French experience in urban insurgency. This strategy rests upon the principle that a population, organizationally committed to the support of the counterinsurgent effort on a total basis, will provide its own natural defenses against the machinations of an urban apparatus.¹³¹

FOOTNOTES APPENDIX A

1. Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1952), p. 256.
2. Ibid., p. 103.
3. Ibid., p. 260.
4. Robert A. Scalapino, "Japanese Socialism in Crisis," Foreign Affairs, XXXVIII, No. 2 (January 1960), p. 320.
5. Edwin O. Reischauer, "The Broken Dialogue with Japan," Foreign Affairs, XXXIX, No. 1 (October 1960), p. 17.
6. Ibid., p. 17.
7. New York Times, 30 May 1960.
8. New York Times, 11 June 1960.
9. Ibid.
10. New York Times, 26 May 1960.
11. Thus Dr. Kotaro Tanaka, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, declared on 25 May that groups were involved who were under the "influence of foreign powers." (New York Times, 26 May 1960) The Tokyo correspondent of the British Economist, concurred, asserting that "the real organizers of the demonstrations...are almost certainly not Socialists, but dedicated and highly trained Communists." (The Economist, 18 June 1960, p. 1216). And Mr. Hagerty, after the airport incident, remarked that the affair was "carefully planned by a group of professional organizers," and suggested that "they may not even owe their allegiance to Japan." (New York Times, 11 June 1960).
12. Reischauer, "Broken Dialogue," p. 15.
13. New York Times, 26 May 1960.
14. Ibid. According to the Japanese Constitution the upper house of the Diet is in session, its failure to take any action within a 30 day period is considered equivalent to approval of any lower house action. Since the lower house officially passed the bill during its session of 19 May (although it adjourned early on the morning of the 20th) the only requirement for ratification was that the upper house still be in session the following 19 June. This condition was assured when the latter body voted for a 50 day extension of its session on the 26th of May.

15. New York Times, 26 May 1960.
16. New York Times, 27 May 1960.
17. New York Times, 30 May 1960.
18. New York Times, 3 June 1960.
19. New York Times, 4 June 1960.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. New York Times, 5 June 1960.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. New York Times, 11 June 1960.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. The Economist (18 June 1960), p. 1216.
29. Ibid.
30. Robert S. Elegant, The Dragon's Seed: Peking and the Overseas Chinese (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959), p. 172.
31. Ibid., p. 170.
32. Ibid., p. 172.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., p. 174.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., p. 177.
38. Ibid., p. 174.

39. "Background and Chronology of the Events in Panama and the Canal Zone on the Ninth, Tenth, and Subsequent Days in January 1964 for the Committee Established Under the Resolution of the OAS/OC, February, 1964" (Material presented by the United States Government to the Committee), pp. 89-90.
40. "Exhibits to the United States Oral Presentation on February 14 and 15, 1964, to the Committee Established Under the Resolution of the OAS-OC, February 6, 1964" (Photographic material presented by the United States Government to the Committee), photographic slides 26-27.
41. "Inside Story of Panama Riots," U.S. News and World Report (30 March 1964), p. 48.
42. Ibid.
43. "Background," pp. 89-90.
44. "Exhibits," photographic slides 26-27.
45. "Inside Story," p. 50.
46. "Background," p. 90.
47. "Inside Story," p. 49.
48. "Background," p. 26.
49. "Inside Story," p. 51.
50. "Background," p. 27.
51. Ibid., p. 39.
52. Ibid., p. 37.
53. Ibid., p. 48.
54. Ibid., p. 47.
55. Vernon Lee Fluharty, Dance of the Millions (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957), p. 101; and German Arciniegas, The State of Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), p. 162.
56. Fluharty, Dance, p. 102 (quotation from El Tiempo, Bogota, 30 April 1948, p. 8).
57. Ibid., p. 101.

58. Ibid., p. 103. (Quotation from Semana, Bogota, 30 April 1948, p. 1.)
59. Donald Marquand Dozer, "Roots of Revolution in Latin America," Foreign Affairs, XXVII, No. 2 (January 1949), p. 287.
60. Fluharty, Dance, p. 101.
61. Dozer, "Roots," p. 284.
62. Arciniegas, State of Latin America, p. 161.
63. Ibid., p. 161 (quotation from the monthly magazine Reconquista, Bogota, (April 1948)).
64. Fluharty, Dance, p. 99.
65. Ibid., p. 101.
66. Arciniegas, State of Latin America, p. 162.
67. Dozer, "Roots," p. 286.
68. Ibid., p. 287.
69. John J. Finan, "The Violence in Colombia," (Unpublished Monograph), School of International Service, The American University, p. 3.
70. Hugh Tinker, The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Years of Independence (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 36-37.
71. Neither the existence of a Muslim terrorist group, the Mujahids, seeking to form a separate state (Tinker, Union, p. 34) nor the call for the establishment of a "Karenistan" constitute a qualification of this assertion. The Muslim group failed to attract support at any time during the emergency, while the "Karenistan" issue "does not even have the support of a majority of the widely scattered Karen minority." (Virginia Thompson and R. Adloff, The Left Wing in Southeast Asia, New York: Wm. Sloane Associates, 1950, p. 127).
72. Human Relations Area Files, Area Handbook for Burma (New Haven, HRAF, 1957-mimeo), p. 94.
73. Tinker, Union, p. 39.
74. Ibid., p. 40.
75. New Times of Burma, 1 February 1949.
76. Tinker, Union, p. 42.

77. New Times of Burma, 5, 6, 8, and 11 February 1949.
78. Tinker, Union, p. 46.
79. Ibid., p. 42.
80. Thompson and Adloff, The Left Wing, p. 12.
81. J.H. Brimmell, Communism in South East Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 311-312 and Thompson and Adloff, The Left Wing, p. 127.
82. New Times of Burma, 5 February 1949.
83. Richard and Joan Brace, Ordeal in Algeria (New York: Van Nostrand, 1960), p. 56.
84. Indian Communist Party Documents, 1930-1956, Compiled by the research staff of the Democratic Research Service with an introduction by V.B. Karnik (Bombay, India: Democratic Research Service & Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957), pp. 79-80.
85. James Eliot Cross, Conflict in the Shadows: The Nature and Politics of Guerilla War (Garden City: Doubleday, 1963), p. 54.
86. Ibid., p. 55.
87. James H. Meisel, The Fall of the Republic (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1962), pp. 232-233.
88. Ibid., p. 211.
89. Ruby Hart Phillips, Cuba: Island of Paradox (New York: McDowell and Obolensky, 1959), pp. 225 and 239.
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91. Cross, Conflict, p. 55.
92. Robert J. Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1958), p. 43.
93. M.J. Olgin, Why Communism? (New York: Worker's Library Publishers, 2nd ed. May 1935) pp. 59-60. Reproduced in: Investigation of UnAmerican Propaganda Activities in the U.S., House of Representatives Dies Committee (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1955), Appendix, Part 1, pp. 741-742.
94. The Haganah had an excellent division of authority subject to integrated coordinated control at the top; thus, Haganah recognized the

classical threefold division of its military forces. The elite military formation (Palmach) was a restricted body of some 2,500 men and women. Second to it came an auxiliary military force, well trained but not equal to the Palmach, known as the Hish, numbering some 9,500 men. Finally there existed a local defense organization (Him) of some 32,500 men and women. Aside from this organization of military forces, Haganah recognized an illegal underground apparatus primarily concerned with illegal immigration, escape and evasion, and intelligence (Mosdd; Bricha; Shai). Likewise there existed a system of mass or front organizations; among them Haganah's youth group, the Gadna. Andrew R. Molnar, et. al., Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, 1963), pp. 337-338.

95. Alexander, National Revolution, pp. 29-45.
96. Richard W. Patch, "Bolivia: The Restrained Revolution," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 334 (March 1961), p. 127.
97. Alexander, National Revolution, p. 44.
98. Arnold C. Brackman, Indonesian Communism, A History (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 71.
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123. Guevara, Guerilla Warfare, pp. 37-38.
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125. Ibid., pp. 95-96.
126. Ibid., p. 96.
127. Ibid.

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129. Ibid., pp. 96 and 99.
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